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Senator Nixon Takes Tough Stand on Communism

Senator Nixon Takes Tough Stand on Communism


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As a candidate for vice president, Sen. Richard Nixon delivers a speech at a political rally in Sanford, Maine, on September 3, 1952, and promises that he will take care of the communist problem plaguing the federal government.


Vietnam War in Georgia

Joseph A. Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations 1789-1973(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002).

Joseph A. Fry, The American South and the Vietnam War: Belligerence, Protest, and Agony in Dixie (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

Gilbert C. Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator From Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

Daniel S. Lucks, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

Clyde Taylor, ed., Vietnam and Black America: An Anthology of Protest and Resistance (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1973).

Thomas W. Zeiler, Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000).

Caroline F. Ziemke, "Senator Richard B. Russell and the ‘Lost Cause’ in Vietnam, 1954-1968," Georgia Historical Quarterly 72 (Spring 1988): 30-71.


The Cold War Home Front: McCarthyism

But other forces also contributed to McCarthyism. The right-wing had long been wary of liberal, progressive policies like child labor laws and women's suffrage, which they viewed as socialism or communism. This was especially true of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. As far as the right was concerned, "New Dealism,&rdquo was heavily influenced by communism, and by the end of WWII it had ruled American society for a dozen years. During the McCarthyism era, much of the danger they saw was about vaguely defined "communist influence" rather than direct accusations of being Soviet spies. In fact, throughout the entire history of post-war McCarthyism, not a single government official was convicted of spying. But that didn&rsquot really matter to many Republicans. During the Roosevelt Era they had been completely shut out of power. Not only did Democrats rule the White House, they had controlled both houses of congress since 1933. During the 1944 elections the Republican candidate Thomas Dewey had tried to link Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal with communism. Democrats fired back by associating Republicans with Fascism. By the 1946 midterm elections, however, fascism had largely been defeated in Europe, but communism loomed as an even larger threat. Republicans found a winning issue. By &ldquoRed-baiting" their Democratic opponents—labeling them as "soft on communism," they gained traction with voters.

To bolster his claim that Hiss was a communist, Chambers produced sixty-five pages of retyped State Department documents and four pages in Hiss's own handwriting of copied State Department cables which he claimed to have obtained from Hiss in the 1930s the typed papers having been retyped from originals on the Hiss family's Woodstock typewriter. Both Chambers and Hiss had previously denied committing espionage. By introducing these documents, Chambers admitted that he had lied to the committee. Chambers then produced five rolls of 35 mm film, two of which contained State Department documents. Chambers had hidden the film in a hollowed-out pumpkin on his Maryland farm, and they became known as the “pumpkin papers".

From Lee case no. 40:
The employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City. His application is very sketchy. There has been no investigation. (C-8) is a reference. Though he is 43 years of age, his file reflects no history prior to June 1941.

McCarthy's speech was a lie, but Republicans went along for political gain. Democrats tried to pin him down on his list, and McCarthy first agreed, and then refused to name names. He couldn't have named any names if he had wanted to. The Lee List used only case numbers. He did not get a copy of the key to the list, matching names with the case numbers, until several weeks later. Democrats had little choice but to agree to the creation of a committee to investigate McCarthy's charges. They also acceded to Republican demands that the Congress be given the authority to subpoena the loyalty records of all government employees against whom charges would be heard. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon insisted that the hearings be conducted in public, but even so, the investigators were able to take preliminary evidence and testimony in executive session (in private). The final Senate resolution authorized "a full and complete study and investigation as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been employed by the Department of the State."

June 14, 1954: In a gesture against the "godless communism" of the Soviet Union, the phrase "under God" was incorporated into the Pledge of Allegiance by a Joint Resolution of Congress amending §7 of the Flag Code enacted in 1942.

August 24, 1954: The Communist Control Act was signed by President Eisenhower. It outlawed the Communist Party of the United States and criminalized membership in, or support for, the Party.


Nixon: The Meaning Of Communism To Americans

This is the text of a speech given by Richard Nixon during his 1960 presidential election campaign.

The Meaning Of Communism To Americans

by Vice-President Richard Nixon

The major problem confronting the people of the United States and free peoples everywhere in the last half of the 20th century is the threat to peace and freedom presented by the militant aggressiveness of international communism. A major weakness in this struggle is lack of adequate imderstanding of the character of the challenge which communism presents.

I am convinced that we are on the right side in this struggle and that we are well ahead now in its major aspects. But if we are to maintain our advantage and assure victory in the struggle, we must develop, not only among the leaders, but among the people of the free world a better understanding of the threat which confronts us.

The question is not one of being for or against communism. The time is long past when any significant number of Americans contend that communism is no particular concern of theirs. Few can still believe that communism is simply a curious and twisted philosophy which happens to appeal to a certain number of zealots but which constitutes no serious threat to the interests or ideals of free society.

The days of indifference are gone. The danger today in our attitude toward communism is of a very different kind. It lies in the fact that we have come to abhor communism so much that we no longer recognize the necessity of understanding it.

We see the obvious dangers. We recognize that we must retain our present military and economic advantage over the Communist bloc, an advantage which deters a hot war and which counters the Communist threat in the cold war. In the fields of rocket technology and space exploration, we have risen to the challenge and we will keep the lead that we have gained. There is no question that the American people generally will support whatever programs our leaders initiate in these fields.

What we must realize is that this struggle probably will not be decided in the military, economic, or scientific areas, important as these are. The battle in which we are engaged is primarily one of ideas. The test is one not so much of arms but of faith.

If we are to win a contest of ideas we must know their ideas as well as our own. Our knowledge must not be superficial. We cannot be content with simply an intuition that communism is wrong. It is not enough to rest our case alone on the assertions, true as they are, that communism denies God, enslaves men, and destroys justice.

We must recognize that the appeal of the Communist idea is not to the masses, as the Communists would have us believe, but more often to an intelligent minority in newly developing countries who are trying to decide which system offers the best and surest road to progress.

We must cut through the exterior to the very heart of the Communist idea. We must come to understand the weaknesses of communism as a system – why after more than 40 years on trial it continues to disappoint so many aspirations, why it has failed in its promise of equality in abundance, why it has produced a whole library of disillusionment and a steady stream of men, women, and children seeking to escape its blight.

But we must also come to understand its strength – why it has so securely entrenched itself in the U.S.S.R., why it has been able to accomplish what it has in the field of education and science, why in some of the problem areas of the world it continues to appeal to leaders aspiring to a better life for their people.

It is to find the answers to these questions that in this statement I want to discuss communism as an idea – its economic philosophy, its philosophy of law and politics, its philosophy of history.

This statement will admittedly not be simple because the subject is complex.

It will not be brief because nothing less than a knowledge in depth of the Communist idea is necessary if we are to deal with it effectively.

In discussing the idea I will not offer programs to meet it. I intend in a later statement to discuss the tactics and vulnerabilities of the Communist conspiracy and how we can best fashion a strategy for victory.

I anticipate that some might understandably ask the question – why such a lengthy discussion of communism when everybody is against it already?

If the free world is to win this struggle, we must have men and women who not only are against communism but who know why they are against it and who know what they are going to do about it. Communism is a false idea, and the answer to a false idea is truth, not ignorance.

One of the fundamentals of the Communist philosophy is a belief that societies pass inevitably through certain stages. Each of these stages is supposed to generate the necessity for its successor. Feudalism contained within its loins the seed of capitalism capitalism was, in other words, to supplant feudalism. Capitalism, in turn, moves inevitably toward a climax in which it will be supplanted by its appointed successor, communism. All of these things are matters of necessity and there is nothing men can do to change the inflexible sequence which history imposes.

It is a part of this philosophy that, as society moves along its predestined way, each stage of development is dominated by a particular class. Feudalism was dominated by the aristocracy capitalism by something called the bourgeoisie communism by the proletariat. During any particular stage of society’s development the whole of human life within that society is run and rigged for the benefit of the dominant class no one else counts for anything and the most he can expect is the leftover scraps. In the end, of course, with the final triumph of communism, classes will disappear – what was formerly the proletariat will expand so that it is the only class, and, since there are no longer any outsiders that it can dominate, there will in effect be no classes at all.

Now this theory of successive stages of development makes it clear that, if we are to understand communism, we must understand the Communist view of capitalism, for, according to Communist theory, capitalism contains within itself the germs of communism. The Communist notion of capitalism is that it is a market economy, an economy of “free trade, free selling and buying,” to quote the manifesto again. It follows from this that, since communism inevitably supplants and destroys capitalism, it cannot itself be anything like market economy.

The fundamental belief of the Communist economic philosophy therefore is a negative one namely, a belief that, whatever the economic system of mature communism may turn out to be, it cannot be a market economy it cannot – in the words of the Communist Manifesto – be an economy based on “free trade, free selling and buying.”

It may be well at this point to digress for the purpose of recalling the curious fact that the literature of communism contains so many praises for the achievements of capitalism. The manifesto contains these words about the market economy of capitalism and its alleged overlords, the bourgeoisie:

It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former migrations of nations and
crusades. * * * The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce 100 years (the manifesto speaks from the year 1848), has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social
labor?

Marx and Engels could afford this praise for capitalism because they supposed it would everywhere be succeeded by communism, a stage of society whose glories would in turn dwarf all the achievements of capitalism. Communism would build on capitalism and bring a new economy that would make the capitalist world look like a poorhouse. Those who constituted the dominant class of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, would have performed their historic mission and would be dismissed from the scene – dismissed without thanks, of course, for after all they only accomplished what was foreordained by the forces of history, forces that were now to throw them into the discard like the husk of a sprouting seed.

One of the most startling gaps in the Communist theory is the lack of any clear notion of how a Communist economy would be organized. In the writings of the great founders of communism there is virtually nothing on this subject. This gap was not an oversight, but was in fact a necessary consequence of the general theory of communism. That theory taught, in effect, that as a society moves inevitably from one level of development to another, there is no way of knowing what the next stage will demand until in fact it has arrived. Communism will supplant and destroy the market economy of capitalism. What will its own economy be like? That we cannot know until we are there and have a chance to see what the world looks like without any institution resembling an economic market. The manifesto, in fact, expresses a deep contempt for “utopian socialists” who propose “an organization of society specially contrived” by them, instead of waiting out the verdict of history and depending on the “spontaneous class organization of the proletariat.” The Communist economy would organize itself according to principles that would become apparent only when the arena had been cleared of the market principle.

Operating then, in this vacuum of guidance left behind by their prophets, how did the founders of the Soviet Union proceed to organize their new economy? The answer is that they applied as faithfully as they could the teachings of their masters. Since those teachings were essentially negative, their actions had to have the same quality. They started by attempting to root out from the Russian scene every vestige of the market principle, even discouraging the use of money, which they hoped soon to abolish altogether. The production and distribution of goods were put under central direction, the theory being that the flow of goods would be directed by social need without reference to principles of profit and loss. This experiment began in 1919 and came to an abrupt end in March of 1921. It was a catastrophic failure. It brought with it administrative chaos and an almost inconceivable disorder in economic affairs, culminating in appalling shortages of the most elementary necessities.

Competent scholars estimate its cost in Russian lives at 5 million. The official Russian version of this experiment does not deny that it was an enormous failure. It attributes that failure to inexperience and to a mythical continuation of military operations, which had in fact almost wholly ceased. Meanwhile the Russian economy has been moving steadily toward the market principle.

The flow of labor is controlled by wages, so that the price of labor is itself largely set by market forces. The spread from top to bottom of industrial wages is in many cases wider than it is in this country. Managerial efficiency is promoted by substantial economic incentives in the form of bonuses and even more substantial perquisites of various kinds. Enterprises are run on a profit and loss basis. Indeed, there are all the paraphernalia of an advanced commercial society, with lawyers, accountants, balance sheets, taxes of many kinds, direct and indirect, and finally even the pressures of a creeping inflation.

The allocation of resources in Russia probably now comes about as close to being controlled by the market principle as is possible where the government owns all the instruments of production. Russian economists speak learnedly of following the “Method of Balances.”

This impressive phrase stands for a very simple idea. It means that in directing production and establishing prices an effort is made to come out even, so that goods for which there is an insufficient demand will not pile up, while shortages will not develop in other fields where demand exceeds supply. The “Method of Balances” turns out to be something a lot of us learned about in school as the law of supply and demand.

All of this is not to say that the Russian economy has fully realized the market principle. There are two obstacles that block such a development. The first lies in the fact that there is a painful tension between what has to be done to run the economy efficiently and what ought to be happening according to orthodox theory. The result is that the Russian economist has to be able to speak out of both sides of his mouth at the same time. He has to be prepared at all times for sudden shifts of the party line. If today he is condemned as an “unprincipled revisionist” who apes capitalist methods, tomorrow he may be jerked from the scene for having fallen into a “sterile orthodoxy”, not realizing that Marxism is a developing and creative science.

The other obstacle to the realization of a free market lies in the simple fact that the government owns the whole of industry. This means, for one thing, that the industrial units are huge, so that all of steel, or all of cosmetics, for example, is under a single direction. This naturally creates the economic condition known as oligopoly and the imperfectly functioning market which attends that condition.

Furthermore, a realization of the market principle would require the managers of the various units of industry to act as if they were doing something they are not, that is, as if they were directing independent enterprises. Understandably there is a considerable reluctance to assume this fictitious role, since the manager’s reward for an inconvenient independence may well be a trip to Siberia where he is likely nowadays, they say, to be made chief bookkeeper in a tiny power plant 300 miles from the nearest town. Meanwhile, a constant theme of complaint by Moscow against the managers is that they are too “cousinly” with one another and that they are too addicted to “back scratching.” They ought to be acting like capitalist entrepreneurs, but they find this a little difficult when they are all working for the same boss.

One of the most familiar refrains of Communist propaganda is that “capitalism is dying of its internal contradictions.” In fact, it would be hard to imagine a system more tortured by internal contradictions than present-day Russia. It constantly has to preach one way and act another. When Russian economists and managers discover that they have to do something that seems to contradict the prophets, they usually don’t know which of three justifications – all hazardous – they ought to attempt: (1) to explain their action as a temporary departure from Marxist propriety to be corrected in a more propitious future (2) to show that what they are doing can be justified by the inherited text if it is read carefully and between the lines or (3) to invoke the cliché that Marxism is a progressive science that learns by experience – we can’t after all, expect Marx, Engels, and Lenin to have foreseen everything.

These inner tensions and perplexities help to explain the startling “shifts in the party line” that characterize all of the Communist countries. It is true that these shifts sometimes reflect the outcome of a subterranean personal power struggle within the party. But we must remember that they also at times result from the struggles of conscientious men trying to fit an inconvenient text to the facts of reality.

The yawning gap in Communist theory, by which it says nothing about how the economy shall be run except that it shall not be by the market principle, will continue to create tensions, probably of mounting intensity, within and among the Communist nations. The most painful compromise that it has so far necessitated occurred when it was decided that trade among the satellite countries should be governed by the prices set on the world market.

This embarrassing concession to necessity recognized, on the one hand, that a price cannot be meaningful unless it is set by something like a market, and, on the other, the inability of the Communist system to develop a reliable pricing system within its own government-managed economy.

The Communist theory has now had a chance to prove itself by an experience extending over two generations in a great nation of huge human and material resources. What can we learn from this experience? We can learn, first of all, that it is impossible to run an advanced economy successfully without resort to some variant of the market principle. In time of war, when costs are largely immaterial and all human efforts converge on a single goal, the market principle can be subordinated. In a primitive society, where men live on the verge of extinction and all must be content with the same meager ration, the market principle largely loses its relevance. But when society’s aim is to satisfy divers human wants and to deploy its productive facilities in such a way as to satisfy those wants in accordance with their intensity – their intensity as felt by those who have the wants – there is and can be no substitute for the market principle. This the Russian experience proves abundantly. That experience also raises serious doubt whether the market principle can be realized within an economy wholly owned by the government.

The second great lesson of the Russian experience is of deeper import. It is that communism is utterly wrong about its most basic premise, the premise that underlies everything it has to say about economics, law, philosophy, morality, and religion. Communism starts with the proposition that there are no universal truths or general truths of human nature. According to its teachings there is nothing one human age can say to another about the proper ordering of society or about such subjects as justice, freedom, and equality. Everything depends on the stage of society and the economic class that is in power at a particular time.

In the light of this fundamental belief – or rather, this unbending and all-pervasive disbelief – it is clear why communism had to insist that what was true for capitalism could not be true for communism. Among the truths scheduled to die with capitalism was the notion that economic life could be usefully ordered by a market. If this truth seems still to be alive, orthodox Communist doctrine has to label it as an illusion, a ghost left behind by an age now being surpassed. At the present time this particular capitalist ghost seems to have moved in on the Russian economy and threatens to become a permanent guest at the Communist banquet. Let us hope it will soon be joined by some other ghosts, such as freedom, political equality, religion, and constitutionalism.

This brings me to the Communist view of law and politics. Of the Communist legal and political philosophy, we can almost say that there is none. This lack is, again, not an accident, but is an integral part of the systematic negations which make up the Communist philosophy.

According to Marx and Engels, the whole life of any society is fundamentally determined by the organization of its economy. What men will believe what gods, if any, they will worship how they will choose their leaders or let their leaders choose themselves how they will interpret the world about them – all of these are basically determined by economic interests and relations. In the jargon of communism: religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law constitute a superstructure which reflects the underlying economic organization of a particular society. It follows that subjects which fall within the superstructure permit of no general truths for example, what is true for law and political science under capitalism cannot be true under communism.

I have said we can almost assert that there is no Communist philosophy of law and political science. The little there is can be briefly stated. It consists in the assumption that after the revolution there will be a dictatorship (called the dictatorship of the proletariat) and that this dictatorship will for a while find it necessary to utilize some of the familiar political and legal institutions, such as courts. (There is an incredibly tortured literature about just how these institutions are to be utilized and with what modifications.) When, however, mature communism is achieved, law and the state, in the consecrated phrase, “will wither away.” There will be no voting, no parliaments, no judges, no policemen, no prisons – no problems. There will simply be factories and fields and a happy populace peacefully reveling in the abundance of their output.

As with economic theory, there was a time in the history of the Soviet regime when an attempt was made to take seriously the absurdities of this Communist theory of law and state. For about a decade during the thirties an influential doctrine was called the commodity exchange theory of law. According to this theory, the fundamental fact about capitalism is that it is built on the economic institution of exchange. In accordance with the doctrine of the superstructure, all political and legal institutions under capitalism must therefore be permeated and shaped by the concept of exchange. Indeed, the theory went further. Even the rules of morality are based on exchange, for is there not a kind of tacit deal implied even in the Golden Rule, “Do unto others, as you would be done by”? Now the realization of communism, which is the negation of capitalism, requires the utter rooting out of any notion of exchange in the Communist economy. But when exchange has disappeared, the political, legal, and moral superstructure that was built on it will also disappear. Therefore, under mature communism there will not only be no capitalistic legal and political institutions, there will be no law whatever, no state, no morality – for all of these in some measure reflect the underlying notion of an exchange or deal among men.

The high priest of this doctrine was Eugene Pashukanis. His reign came to an abrupt end in 1937 as the inconvenience of his teachings began to become apparent. With an irony befitting the career of one who predicted that communism would bring an end to law and legal processes, Pashukanis was quietly taken off and shot without even the semblance of a trial.

As in the case of economics, since Pashukanis’ liquidation there has developed in Russian intellectual life a substantial gray market for capitalistic legal and political theories. But where Russian economists seem ashamed of their concessions to the market principle, Russian lawyers openly boast of their legal and political system, claiming for it that it does everything that equivalent bourgeois institutions do, only better. This boast has to be muted somewhat, because it still remains a matter of dogma that under mature communism, law and the state will disappear. This embarrassing aspect of their inherited doctrine the Soviet theorists try to keep as much as possible under the table. They cannot, however, openly renounce it without heresy, and heresy in the Soviet Union, be it remembered, still requires a very active taste for extinction.

One of the leading books on Soviet legal and political theory is edited by a lawyer who is well known in this country, the late Andrei Vyshinsky. In the table-pounding manner he made famous in the U.N., Vyshinsky praises Soviet legal and political institutions to the skies and contrasts their wholesome purity with the putrid vapors emanating from the capitalist countries. He points out, for example, that in Russia the voting age is 18, while in many capitalist countries it is 21.

The capitalists thus disenfranchise millions of young men and women because, says Vyshinsky, it is feared they may not yet have acquired a properly safe bourgeois mentality. As one reads arguments like this spelled out with the greatest solemnity, and learns all about the “safeguards” of the Soviet Constitution, it comes as a curious shock to find it openly declared that in the Soviet Union only one political party can legally exist and that the Soviet Constitution is “the only constitution in the world which frankly declares the directing role of the party in the state.”

One wonders what all the fuss about voting qualifications is about if the voters are in the end permitted only to vote for the candidates chosen by the only political party permitted to exist. The plain fact is, of course, that everything in the Soviet Constitution relating to public participation in political decisions is a facade concealing the real instrument of power that lies in the Communist Party. It has been said that hypocrisy is vice’s tribute to virtue. The holding of elections in which the electorate is given no choice may similarly be described as an attempt by communism to salve its uneasy conscience. Knowing that it cannot achieve representative democracy, it seems to feel better if it adopts its empty forms.

When one reflects on it, it is an astounding thing that a great and powerful nation in the second half of the 20th century should still leave its destinies to be determined by intraparty intrigue, that it should have developed no political institutions capable of giving to its people a really effective voice in their Government, that it should lack any openly declared and lawful procedure by which the succession of one ruler to another could be determined. Some are inclined to seek an explanation for this condition in Russian history with its bloody and irregular successions of czars. But this is to forget that even in England, the mother of parliaments, there were once in times long gone by some pretty raw doings behind palace walls and some unseemly and even bloody struggles for the throne.

But where other nations have worked gradually toward stable political institutions guaranteeing the integrity of their governments, Russia has remained in a state of arrested development. That state will continue until the Russian leaders have the courage to declare openly that the legal and political philosophy of Marx, Engles, and Lenin is fundamentally mistaken and must be abandoned.

How heavy the burden of the inherited Communist philosophy is becomes clear when the concept of law itself is under discussion. Throughout the ages, among men of all nations and creeds, law has generally been thought of as a curb on arbitrary power. It has been conceived as a way of substituting reason for force in the decision of disputes, thus liberating human energies for the pursuit of aims more worthy of man’s destiny than brute survival or the domination of one’s fellows. No one has supposed that these ideals have ever been fully realized in any society. Like every human institution, law is capable of being exploited for selfish purposes and of losing its course through a confusion of purposes. But during most of the world’s history, men have thought that the questions worthy of discussion were how the institutions of law could be shaped so that they might not be perverted into instruments of power or lose the sense of their high mission through sloth or ignorance.

What is the Communist attitude toward this intellectual enterprise in which so many great thinkers of so many past ages have joined? Communism consigns all of it to the ashcan of history as a fraud and delusion, beneath the contempt of Communist science. How, then, is law defined today in Russia? We have an authoritative answer. It is declared to be “the totality of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant class, designed to promote those relationships that are advantageous and agreeable to the dominant class.”

Law in the Soviet Union is not conceived as a check on power, it is openly and proudly an expression of power. In this conception surely, if anywhere, the bankruptcy of communism as a moral philosophy openly declares itself.

It is vitally important to emphasize again that all of the truly imposing absurdities achieved by Communist thought – in whatever field: in economics, in politics, in law, in morality – that all of these trace back to a single common source. That origin lies in a belief that nothing of universal validity can be said of human nature, that there are no principles, values, or moral truths that stand above a particular age or a particular phase in the evolution of society. This profound negation lies at the very heart of the Communist philosophy and gives to it both its motive force and its awesome capacity for destruction.

It is this central negation that makes communism radically inconsistent with the ideal of human freedom. As with other bourgeois virtues, once dismissed contemptuously, Soviet writers have now taken up the line that only under communism can men realize “true freedom.” This line may even have a certain persuasiveness for Russians in that individuals tend to prize those freedoms they are familiar with and not to miss those they have never enjoyed. A Russian transplanted suddenly to American soil might well feel for a time “unfree” in the sense that he would be confronted with the burden of making choices that he was unaccustomed to making and that he would regard as onerous. But the problem of freedom goes deeper than the psychological conditioning of any particular individual. It touches the very roots of man’s fundamental conception of himself.

The Communist philosophy is basically inconsistent with the ideal of freedom because it denies that there can be any standard of moral truth by which the actions of any given social order may be judged. If the individual says to government, “Thus far may you go, but no farther,” he necessarily appeals to some principle of rightness that stands above his particular form of government. It is precisely the possibility of any such standard that communism radically and uncomprisingly denies. Marx and Engels had nothing but sneers for the idea that there are “eternal truths, such as freedom, justice, etc., that are common to all states of society.”

They contend that there are no eternal truths. All ideas of right and wrong come from the social system under which one lives. If that system requires tyranny and oppression, then tyranny and oppression must within that system be accepted there can be no higher court of appeal.

Not only do the premises of Communist philosophy make any coherent theory of freedom impossible, but the actual structure of the Soviet regime is such that no true sense of freedom can ever develop under it. To see why this is so, it is useful to accept the Communist ideology provisionally and reason the matter out purely in terms of what may be called human engineering. Let us concede that a struggle for political power goes on in all countries and let us assume in keeping with Marxist views that this struggle has absolutely nothing to do with right and wrong. Even from this perversely brutal point of view, it is clear why a sense of freedom can never develop under the Soviet regime. In a constitutional democracy the struggle for political power is assigned to a definite arena it is roped off, so to speak, from the rest of life. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, there is no clear distinction between politics and economics, or between politics and other human activities. No barriers exist to define what is a political question and what is not. Instead of being ordered and canalized as it is in constitutional democracies, the struggle for political power in Russia pervades, or can at any time pervade, every department of life. For this reason there is no area of human interest – the intellectual, literary, scientific, artistic, or religious – that may not at any time become a battleground of this struggle.

Take, for example, the situation of a Soviet architect. Today without doubt he enjoys a certain security he is not likely to lie awake fearing the dread knock at the door at midnight. Furthermore, he may now see opening before him in the practice of his profession a degree of artistic freedom that his predecessors did not enjoy. But he can never be sure that he will not wake up tomorrow morning and read in the papers that a new “line” has been laid down for architecture, since his profession, like every other, can at any moment be drawn into the struggle for power. He can never know the security enjoyed by those who live under a system where the struggle for political power is fenced off, as it were, from the other concerns of life. When Soviet “politics” invades a field like architecture, it cannot be said to spread beyond its proper boundaries, for it has none. It is precisely this defect in the Soviet regime that in the long run prevents the realization of the ideal of freedom under communism.

It is only in the constitutional democracies that the human spirit can be permanently free to unfold itself in as many directions as are opened up for it by its creative urge. Only such governments can achieve diversity without disintegration, for only they know the full meaning of “those wise restraints that make men free.”

Since the Communist philosophy of history is the central core of its ideology, that philosophy has of necessity permeated every theme I have so far discussed. Briefly stated the Communist philosophy of history is that man does not make history, but is made by it.

Though communism denies to man the capacity to shape his own destiny, it does accord to him a remarkable capacity to foresee in great detail just what the future will impose on him. The literature of communism is full of prophecies, tacit and explicit. Probably no human faith ever claimed so confidently that it knew so much about the future. Certainly none ever ran up a greater number of bad guesses. On a rough estimate the Communist record for mistaken prophecies stands at about 100 percent.

Among the conclusions about the future that were implicit in the Communist philosophy, or were drawn from it by its prophets, we can name the following:

That communism will first establish itself in countries of the most advanced capitalism

That in such countries society will gradually split itself into two classes, with the rich becoming fewer and richer, the laboring masses sinking steadily to a bare level of existence

That under capitalism colonialism will increase as each capitalistic nation seeks more and more outlets for its surplus production

That in capitalist countries labor unions will inevitably take the lead in bringing about the Communist revolution

That as soon as communism is firmly established steps will be taken toward the elimination of the capitalist market and capitalist political and legal institutions etc.

As with other aspects of communism, this record of bad guesses is no accident. It derives from the basic assumption of Marxism that man has no power to mold his institutions to meet problems as they arise, that he is caught up in a current of history which carries him inevitably toward his predestined goal. A philosophy which embraces this view of man’s plight is constitutionally incapable of predicting the steps man will take to shape his own destiny, precisely because it has in advance declared any such steps to be impossible. Communism in this respect is like a man standing on the bank of a rising river and observing what appears to be a log lodged against the opposite shore. Assuming that what he observes is an inert object, he naturally predicts that the log will eventually be carried away by the rising floodwaters. When the log turns out to be a living creature and steps safely out of the water the observer is, of course, profoundly surprised. Communism, it must be confessed, has shown a remarkable capacity to absorb such shocks, for it has survived many of them. In the long run, however, it seems inevitable that the Communist brain will inflict serious damage upon itself by the tortured rationalizations with which it has to explain each successive bad guess.

This brings us to the final issue. Why is it that with all its brutalities and absurdities communism still retains an active appeal for the minds and hearts of many intelligent men and women? For we must never forget that this appeal does exist.

It is true that in the United States and many other countries the fringe of serious thought represented by active Communist belief has become abraded to the point of near extinction. It is also the fact that many people everywhere adhere to groups dominated by Communist leadership who have only the slightest inkling of communism as a system of ideas. Then again we must remember that in the Communist countries themselves there are many intelligent, loyal, and hard-working citizens, thoroughly acquainted with the Communist philosophy, who view that philosophy with a quiet disdain, not unmixed with a certain sardonic pleasure of the sort that goes with witnessing, from a choice seat, a comedy of errors that is unfortunately also a tragedy Finally we must not confuse every “gain of communism” with a gain of adherents to Communist beliefs. In particular, we should not mistake the acceptance of technical and economic aid from Moscow as a conversion to the Communist faith, though the contacts thus established may, of course, open the way for a propagation of that faith.

With all this said, and with surface appearance discounted in every proper way, the tragic fact remains that communism as a faith remains a potent force in the world of ideas today. It is an even more tragic fact that that faith can sometimes appeal not only to opportunists and adventurers, but also to men of dedicated idealism. How does this come about?

To answer this question we have to ask another: What are the ingredients that go to make up a successful fighting faith, a faith that will enlist the devotion and fanaticism of its adherents, that will let loose on the world that unaccommodating creature, “the true believer”?

I think that such a faith must be made up of at least three ingredients.

First, it must lift its adherents above the dread sense of being alone and make them feel themselves members of a brotherhood.

Second, it must make its adherents believe that in working for the objectives of their faith they are moving in step with nature, or with the forces of history, or with the divine will.

Third, it must be a faith that gives to its adherents a sense of being lifted above the concerns that consume the lives of the nonbelieving.

All of these ingredients are furnished in abundance by communism. In the Communist philosophy the first two ingredients are fused into one doubly effective amalgam. To become a Communist is no longer to be alone, but to join in the march of a great, oppressed mass of humanity called the proletariat. This silent, faceless army is being carried inevitably to its goal by the unseen forces of history. There is thus a double identification. History belongs to the proletariat, the proletariat belongs to history. By joining in this great march the Communist not only gains human companions but a sense of responding to the great pull of the universe itself.

Now the picture I have just painted is not one that even the most devout Communist can comfortably carry about with him at all times. Indeed, there are probably few Communists who do not, even in their moments of highest faith, sense some of the fictions and contradictions of the dream to which they are committed. The absurdities of the Communist ideology are, however, by no means immediately apparent to the new convert, who is likely to be intrigued rather by the difficulty of understanding them. The old believer sees no reason to point out these absurdities, partly because he does not wish to undermine the faith of the young, and partly because he has become inured to them, has learned to live with them at peace, and does not want to disturb his own adjustment to them.

One of the key fictions of the Communist edifice of thought is the belief that there is in modern industrial society an identifiable class of people called the proletariat. That such a class would develop was not a bad guess in 1848 and Marx had other economists with him in making this guess. As usual, history perversely took the wrong turn. And as usual, this has caused communism no particular embarrassment, for it continues – with diminished ardor, to be sure – to talk about the proletariat as if it were actually there. But professing to see things that are not there is often a sign of faith and furnishes, in any event, a bond of union among believers.

To many of its American critics, communism has appeared as a kind of nightmare. Like awakened sleepers still recoiling from the shock of their dream, these critics forget that the nightmare is after all shot through and through with absurdities. The result is to lend to the Communist ideology a substance that, in fact, it does not possess. If in moments of doubt the Communist is inclined to feel that his philosophy is made of air and tinsel, he is reassured and brought back into the fold when he recalls that its critics have declared this philosophy to be profoundly and powerfully vicious.

Part of the tarnish that an uncompliant history has visited on the Communist prophecies has in recent years been removed by the achievements of Russian technology. It is now possible to identify communism with the land that has the highest school buildings, the hugest outdoor rallies, the most colossal statues and the space satellites that weigh the most tons. It is not difficult to make all this appear as a kind of belated flowering of the promises communism began holding out more than a hundred years ago. It is easy to make men forget that none of the solid accomplishments of modern Russia came about by methods remotely resembling anything anticipated by Marx, Engels, or Lenin.

In suggesting the ingredients that go to make up a successful fighting faith, I stated that such a faith must be one “that gives to its adherents a sense of being lifted above the concerns that consume the lives of the nonbelieving.” I have purposely left this aspect of the Communist faith to the last for it is here that the truly nightmarish quality of that faith manifests itself.

Not that it is any objection to a faith that it enables those sharing it to be indifferent to things that seem important to others. The crucial question is, What is it that men are told not to heed? As to the Communist faith there is no ambiguity on this score. It tells men to forget all the teachings of the ages about government, law, and morality. We are told to cast off the intellectual burden left behind by men like Confucius, Mencius, Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant and Bentham. There are no “eternal truths” about society. There is no science of social architecture. Only the simple minded can believe that there are principles guiding the creation of sound legal and political institutions. For the enlightened there is only one rule: Smash the existing “bourgeois” economic and legal order and leave the rest to the “spontaneous class organization of the proletariat.”

In diplomatic dealings the Russians display great respect for American military and economic power, but consider us hopelessly naive in matters political. We are still concerned with trifles as they feel themselves long since to have left behind – trifles like: How do you help a people to realize self-government who have had no experience with its necessary forms and restraints? How, following the overthrow of a tyranny, do you suggest steps that will prevent an interim dictatorship from hardening into a second tyranny?

It is not that the Communists have ideas about sound government that differ from ours. According to strict Communist theory there can be no ideas on such a subject. If a gray market for such ideas has gradually developed in Russia it has not yet reached the point of being ready for the export trade. Russia has engineers able to help the underdeveloped countries build roads and dams and there is no reason to question the competence of these engineers. But whoever heard of Russia sending an expert in political institutions to help a new country design an appropriate form of representative self-government? Not only would such a mission stand in ludicrous incongruity with the present situation of the Communist countries in Europe it would be a repudiation of the basic premises of the whole Communist philosophy.

Even in the economic field, Russia really has nothing to offer the rest of the world but negations. For a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime it was actively disputed in Russia whether for communism there is any such thing as an economic law.

Communistic ideology has had gradually to bend before the plain fact that such laws exist. But Russia has as yet developed no economic institutions that are more than distorted shadows of their capitalist equivalents. Russia may help a new country to develop electric power. It has nothing to say about the social institutions that will determine how that power will be utilized for the good of the whole people.

This great vacuum that lies in the heart of communism explains not only why its philosophy is in the long run so destructive of everything human, but why in the short run it can be so successful. Consider, for example, what it can offer to the leader of a successful revolution. A cruel dictatorship has been overthrown. It had to be overthrown by force because it permitted no elections or never counted the vote honestly. Following the successful revolt, there must be an interval during which order is kept by something approaching a dictatorship. Sooner or later, if the revolution is not to belie its democratic professions, some movement must be made toward representative self-government. This is a period of great difficulty. There is no mystery about its problems. They fit into an almost classic pattern known from antiquity. The revolutionary leaders must find some accommodation with what is left of the old regime. Sooner or later the firing squad must be retired. Even when this is done vengeful hatreds continue to endanger the successful operation of parliamentary government. Among the revolutionary party, men who were once united in overthrowing plain injustice become divided on the question what constitutes a just new order. Militant zealots, useful in the barricades, are too rough for civil government and must be curbed. If curbed too severely, they may take up arms against the new government. Etc., etc. What can communism offer the revolutionary leader caught in this ancient and familiar quandary? It can, of course, offer him material aid. But it can offer him something more significant and infinitely more dangerous, a clear conscience in taking the easy course. It can tell him to forget about elections and his promises of democracy and freedom. It can support this advice with an imposing library of pseudoscience clothing despotism with the appearance of intellectual respectability.

The internal stability of the present Russian Government lends an additional persuasiveness to this appeal. If Russia can get along without elections, why can’t we? Men forget that it is a common characteristic of dictatorships to enjoy internal truces that may extend over decades, only to have the struggle for power renew itself when the problem of a succession arises. This is a pattern written across centuries of man’s struggle for forms of government consistent with human dignity. It is said that the struggle for power cannot under modern conditions with modern armies and modern weapons, take the form of a prolonged civil war. That is no doubt true in a developed economy like that of Russia. The shift in power when it comes may involve only a few quick maneuvers within the apparatus of the party, which have their only outward manifestation in purges or banishments that seal the results. But the fact remains that the fate of millions will be determined by processes which take no account of their interests or wishes, in which they are granted no participation, and which they are not even permitted to observe.

It must not be forgotten that modern Russia was for an indefinite period prior to 1953 governed by a tyranny. This is admitted in Russia today. To be sure, the term “tyranny” is not used, because according to the Communist philosophy a term like that betokens a naive and outdated view of the significance of governmental forms. The Soviet term is “the cult of personality.” According to the official explanation Stalin and his followers in some mysterious way became infected with a mistaken view of Stalin’s proper role. According to ancient wisdom this was because Stalin ruled without the check of constitutional forms and without effective popular participation in his government. In the words of Aristotle, written some 23 centuries ago, “This is why we do not permit a man to rule, but the principle of law, because a man rules in his own interest, and becomes a tyrant.”

It is plain that Stalin at some point became a tyrant. According to Aristotle this was because Russia did not base its government on the principle of law. According to the Communist theory some inexplicable slippage of the gears, some accidental countercurrent of history, led Stalin to embrace incorrect notions about himself.

If mankind is to survive at a level of dignity worthy of its great past, we must help the world recapture some sense of the teachings of the great thinkers of former ages. It must come again to see that sound legal and political institutions not only express man’s highest ideal of what he may become, but that they are indispensable instruments for enabling him to realize that ideal. It would be comforting to believe that the forces of history are working inevitably toward this realization and that we too are cooperating with the inevitable. We can only hope that this is so. But we can know that the forces of human life, struggling to realize itself on its highest plane, are working with us and that those forces need our help desperately.


Useful Notes / Richard Nixon

If you could write a Shakespearean tragedy about any United States president, none would be a more viable candidate than Richard Milhous Nixon (January 9, 1913 – April 22, 1994).

Nixon was the 37th President of the United States (1969㫢). The 14th President from the Republican Party, he served between Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford. Prior to that he was the Vice President under President Dwight Eisenhower from 1953㫕. One of the least popular Presidents&mdashif not the least popular&mdashamong the general public today, note He was reelected with over 60% of the vote, carrying 49 states, but after his downfall few people would admit to having voted for him in 1972, and the only president who seems to rival him in terms of unpopularity is James Buchanan, notorious for his apathy towards the escalating tensions in America during his tenure that led to the Civil War he is infamous for his role in the Watergate scandal which led to his resignation. Nixon remains the only President so far to resign from the office.

Nixon was born into a poor household in the Quaker colony of Whittier, Los Angeles County, California, in what was then the vast rural hinterland of Los Angeles. The son of lemon farmers Hannah and Francis Nixon, he was the second youngest of a group of five brothers. Nixon's early years was marked by hardship and poverty one of his brothers, Arthur, would die at the age of 7, while another, Harold, passed away from tuberculosis in his early twenties. Nixon would eventually work his way through the education system, where he managed to distinguished himself, earning a Bachelors degree in history from Whittier College in 1934 and a Masters degree in law from Duke University in 1937.

While he originally planned to use his law degree to join the FBI, Nixon would instead drift into working as a practicing attorney. In 1938, while a part of a community theater play, he met the high school school teacher Thelma "Pat" Ryan. Though reluctant at first, Pat eventually agreed to date him, and they eventually married in 1940. When World War II broke out, Nixon, setting aside his birthright as a Quarker which exempted him from the draft, sought a commission in the US Navy. His application was successful, and he was appointed a lieutenant junior grade in the United States Naval Reserve on June 15, 1942. He would continue to serve in active duty until 1946.

Nixon's political career began in earnest in 1947, when local Republicans in California's 12th congressional district asked him to head their challenge the Democratic incumbent Jerry Voorhis. Nixon, who had already participated in school politics in his youth, found the prospect exciting and accepted the nomination. In a bit of foreshadowing of his future career in politics would turn out, Nixon's campaign was mainly rooted in attacking Voorhis for vague second-hand connections to communist organisations and insinuating that he held radical views. Nixon eventually defeated Voorhis with about 15,000 votes in his favor.

Already in early 1949, Nixon began to consider running for the United States Senate against the Democratic incumbent, Sheridan Downey, and entered the race in November. Downey, meanwhile, having fought in a bitter primary against challenger Helen Gahagan Douglas, decided to retire from politics and forfeited the nomination to Douglas. Once again using plenty of red baiting, some underhanded tactics, and quite a bit of not-so-subtle sexism against Douglas, Nixon eventually won the election with 20 percent point, and earned himself the nickname of "Tricky Dick" in the process. As a Senator, Nixon was an outspoken anti-communist, having already involved himself with the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in early 1947 as a result, he early on established friendly relations with the controversial Joseph McCarthy (but true to form, he was careful to keep some distance between himself and McCarthy's allegations, which probably helped to save him from a lot of the later fallout when McCarthy's witchhunting eventually backfired on him).

Nixon's rise to the vice-presidency under Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 was mostly a purely pragmatic decision. When his campaign was under way in 1952, Eisenhower had no strong feelings about what kind of vice-president he wanted, and the Republican party eventually selected Nixon for the post based on his relatively young age of 39, his anti-communism views, and his strong base in California. Nixon, however, ran into trouble during the campaign, when it was revealed that he maintained a political fund supported by his backers, which reimbursed him for political expenses. While such a fund was not strictly illegal, it still exposed Nixon to allegations of possible conflicts of interest and corruption, and resulted in calls for him to resign from the campaign. Nixon, however, once again revealing his talent for propaganda and spin, decided to address the issue himself, through a public speech to the nation, which was broadcasted on radio and television, and as such was heard by about 60 million Americans. In the speech, Nixon overtly played to the audience's emotions, claiming that the fund was no secret, but that it was all above board and subject to oversight, and that he was nothing but an honest American patriot and a family man who lived within modest means. The clincher of the speech, however, was his insistence that the only really questionable gift he had received through the fund was "a little cocker spaniel dog . sent all the way from Texas", and since his young daugther, Tricia, had taken a likening to it and even named it "Checkers", he refused to give it back. The "Checkers speech", as it would be nicknamed, prompted a huge public outpouring of support for Nixon, and Eisenhower ultimately decided to retain him on the ticket.

During his time as vice-president, Nixon was very influential man perhaps the most influential vice-president until Dick Cheney. Nixon attended Cabinet and National Security Council meetings and chaired them when Eisenhower was absent. However, when the Democrats took both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections of 1954, it caused a great crisis of faith in Nixon, who considered resigning once his term as vice-president was up. However, on September 24, 1955, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack, and while he recovered from his health scare, Nixon was asked to fill in for him for six weeks in an official capacity. The event convinced Nixon to join Eisenhower's re-election campaign in 1956.

This would all set the stage for Nixon's actual first run for the White House, which came in 1960, making him the first incumbent vice-president to run for the top job in a century. This resulted in a surprise loss to John F. Kennedy, and while many blamed Nixon's defeat on a combination of bad luck and strategic errors &mdash particularly his poor performance in the first presidential debate note though the perception that he had performed poorly was made by people who watched the debate, which was the first to be televised people who heard the debate on the radio actually felt he won , and an Awesome, but Impractical attempt to campaign equally in all 50 states &mdash Nixon himself believed that the Kennedy family, along with Democratic running-mate Lyndon Johnson and Chicago mayor Richard Daley, had all conspired to commit electoral fraud. While he certainly wasn't the only person to believe this, note (In fact, many historians concur in retrospect that Daley almost certainly did engage in unethical, if not outright illegal actions in order to help Kennedy out, though it's debated as to whether or not this made the difference between Kennedy's winning or losing the state given that Kennedy was a Catholic, and thus would have done well in Chicago anyway due to its high Catholic population. Regardless, evidence for Johnson rigging the result in Texas is far sketchier, and without that state, Nixon would have lost the election regardless of what happened in Illinois. For what it's worth, while Nixon thought Johnson had cheated, he also believed he'd have lost Texas regardless, due to a Republican congressman organizing a protest which ended up turning violent and resulted in Johnson's wife being assaulted) in retrospect it's often pointed to as his Start of Darkness, with many close to him later saying it just made him more determined to win the White House than ever. Nixon was further humiliated in 1962, when he ran for Governor of California and lost in a landslide to popular incumbent Pat Brown. He capped off his defeat with a bitter, angry rant blaming the press for his defeat, termed his "Last Press Conference" as everyone assumed that Nixon had torpedoed his own career.

His reputation damaged by these defeats, Nixon held off on immediately running again in 1964 on the grounds that he could tell that running against Johnson (who replaced Kennedy after his assassination) would be futile. He spent the next several years rebuilding his reputation as a statesman and campaigning for Republican candidates in off-year elections, allowing him to pose as a conciliator between the party's conservative and moderate wings, who had bitterly divided during Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign. Nixon easily won the Republican nomination in 1968, and crushed Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey in the general election Humphrey, as Johnson's Vice President, suffered from public backlash towards the Vietnam War, a divided opposition vote with segregationist candidate George Wallace, and his nomination being seen as a Consolation Award after the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy. Nixon is the most recent President to be elected after having previously been defeated, the last before him being Grover Cleveland in 1892.

Despite his poor reputation today, Nixon had a very successful first term in office with many positive achievements. He continued to implement Johnson's policies of achieving racial integration in American society and oversaw the desegregation of schools. He oversaw the creation of the EPA and OSHA, the passage of the Clean Air Act and other policies aimed at preservation of the environment and natural resources, the Moon Landing (even though he cut funding for NASA almost immediately afterwards) and worked to reform the American health care system with a proposal that was eerily similar to Barack Obama's Affordable Care Act, though only bits and pieces of it made it through Congress. In 1974, he signed into law an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act to raise wages and encompass more employees covered by the law. His administration also helped to advance women's rights, as he supported and oversaw the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment through Congress (even though it failed to achieve ratification after he left office) and oversaw the creation of social programs that expanded girls athletics and skills training in schools. (Yes, our current standard of girls having equal athletic and extracurricular programs as boys in our schools is owed to Nixon.) He also oversaw the ratification of a constitutional amendment that lowered the voting age to 18. He signed the National Cancer Act of 1971, which was the first major national effort towards cancer eradication, generally considered to be the starting point of the War on Cancer. More controversially, he also launched the War on Drugs. He also implemented a number of sudden economic reforms that became known as the "Nixon shock", most notably ending the gold standard and turning the US Dollar into a floating currency.

In foreign policy, Nixon worked with his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to wind down The Vietnam War, greatly reducing conscription (and abolishing it completely in 1973, making military service entirely voluntary) while turning over the defense of South Vietnam to their own forces in a process termed "Vietnamization". Although many of Nixon's tactics, such as increased bombing of North Vietnam and his 1970 invasion of Cambodia, were (and remain) extremely controversial, he was able to conclude American involvement in the war by the end of his first term. note It remains a point of considerable debate whether the Communist conquest of South Vietnam in 1975 would have happened had Nixon not been driven from office, though by that point Congress had severely limited the President's ability to with the War Powers Act anyway. Most notable was Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China where he established US relations with Chairman Mao's Communist regime for the first time. It earned widespread media coverage and coined the phrase "only Nixon could go to China", to describe how a politician with an unassailable reputation on a certain cause can take action that would seem contrary to it without drawing criticism &mdash such as how Nixon could be trusted to visit and establish relations with Communist China given his unquestionable anti-Communist credentials note That might apply to American politics, but the firmly liberal Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, defied his neighboring country's foreign policy and beat Nixon to it years earlier . The China visit had the side effect of reducing tensions with the Soviet Union, as Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev was so shaken by the idea of the Chinese moving closer to America that it moved him to invite Nixon to Moscow to work out their differences. Together they agreed to two landmark arms control treaties, SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The two leaders emerged from their meeting to announce the treaties and a new shared foreign policy goal of peaceful coexistence between the two nations, an objective that became known as "détente". He is also remembered as the American President under wich the CIA plotted to support the overthrow of the socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, by the chilean military under general Pinochet, in the larger context of "Operation Condor", a political repression campaign organized by right-wing authoritarian regimes in South America and the United States aimed at stopping "the spread" of socialism and communism in South American countries.

While Nixon governed as a moderate, New Deal-era conservative, his rhetoric was a different matter entirely. Historians often look to Nixon as a progenitor of the "conservative revolution" that kicked off under Ronald Reagan in The '80s, largely by spurring a realignment of American politics in response to the changes of The '60s. He popularized the term "Silent Majority" to describe the great mass of Americans who, even if they may have disagreed with the war in Vietnam, weren't out in the streets protesting, and certainly weren't into all the drugs, sex, and other junk coming out of the hippie movement. His personal grudge against the press, whom he blamed for his past political failures, helped mainstream accusations of "media bias" which remain commonplace in American politics. Needless to say, Nixon became the eternal enemy of the era's counterculture, perhaps best personified by Hunter S. Thompson, who declared Nixon his Arch-Enemy, along with more mainstream liberals already suspicious of him. His "Southern strategy" is often credited with cleaving away two major Democratic constituencies, white Southerners and white working-class Northerners, by appealing to their right-wing social views.

Playing to patriotism, religious conservatism, and backlash against the Civil Rights Movement, Nixon framed the Democrats of the era as the party of "acid, amnesty, and abortion" &mdash a party defined by the worst excesses of the counterculture that was happy to welcome draft-dodgers back in with open arms (the "amnesty" part) and force shocking new social mores on the rest of the country (the "acid" and "abortion"), versus a Republican Party that stood for the flag, faith, and family values. Nixon dreamed of a massive realignment of the political system, creating a new party consisting of the conservative elements of both parties (he had as little use for "liberal Republicans" like Nelson Rockefeller as he did Democrats), though in practice this never happened. He parlayed his longtime suspicion of the "Eastern Establishment" into a populist anti-elitism, emphasizing that he wasn't part of the upper crust that went to Ivy League schools note He was offered a tuition grant to go to Harvard but turned it down, instead going to Whittier College near his house so he could care for his sick father but was rather a man of the people raised on a ranch.

Given all of his achievements, Nixon enjoyed high approval ratings throughout his first term to the point that his re-election in 1972 appeared a given. His major foreign policy breakthroughs during the election year prevented the Democrats from launching any meaningful campaign against him and he easily steamrolled opponent George McGovern in one of the biggest landslide victories in history. Nixon won every state except for Massachusetts, which lead to "Don't Blame Me, I'm From Massachusetts" bumper stickers becoming popular as Nixon's support cratered. Another notable event of this election was when five men were arrested in June 1972 after being caught breaking into the Watergate hotel to bug the Democratic National Committee's offices.

Nixon's second term was almost entirely dominated by the Watergate scandal. The break-in inadvertently revealed a wide range of illegal activities and abuses of power by the Nixon administration, which included his use of the FBI, CIA and IRS as political weapons to suppress his opponents (compiled in a so-called "Enemies List"), along with the creation of a privately-run "intelligence" agency known as the "Plumbers." Initially formed to stop leaks of sensitive documents after Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers (which were effectively declassified to the American public after Alaskan Senator Mike Gravel read them into the Senate record), the Plumbers (among them ex-FBI agent Gordon Liddy and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt) almost immediately descended into illegal behavior. Among their activities: a break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist to find damaging information, intimidating witnesses in an anti-trust action against ITT (a major donor to Nixon's campaign), spying on and planting damaging stories about Ted Kennedy and other Democrats in the media, and beating up antiwar demonstrators. Which isn't to mention Liddy's proposals to firebomb the liberal Brookings Institution and assassinate journalist Jack Anderson, which were (thankfully) vetoed by his superiors.

Through these means (which collectively became known as the "White House horrors"), Nixon and his campaign then worked to sabotage the campaigns of Democratic presidential candidates to ensure that they nominated McGovern, the candidate Nixon thought he could most easily defeat in the general election. note While Nixon's reelection is sometimes considered a Foregone Conclusion, his other potential opponents - notably Edmund Muskie of Maine - led Nixon in many early polls, and the event that completely destroyed any remote chance that McGovern had of winning the election &mdash namely throwing his initial running-mate Thomas Eagleton off the ticket because of his past mental health issues &mdash didn't happen until nearly two months after the Watergate break-in. While Nixon likely didn't order the Watergate break-in personally, his White House staff - including chief of staff H.R. "Bob" Haldeman and domestic adviser John Ehrlichman, known as the "Berlin Wall" for their closeness to the President - provided the Plumbers with a long leash to engage in any activities, legal or otherwise, which might help the President's reelection chances.

Although Nixon's cover-up was initially successful, information slowly became public through a long series of explosive reports in The Washington Post as reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein corresponded with a source high-up in the federal government known as "Deep Throat", revealed decades later to be deputy FBI director Mark Felt. note Felt largely served as a source because he resented Nixon passing him over for promotion after J. Edgar Hoover's death. Nixon knew, or at least guessed, that Felt was the leaker as he and Bob Haldeman are heard discussing Felt's identity on a White House tape. As the investigations grew closer to the White House, Nixon tried to do whatever he could to obstruct them or shut them down completely, firing Haldeman, Ehrlichman and other aides who became implicated in the scandal while paying hush money to Hunt, Liddy and the other burglars to prevent them from talking. Responding to Watergate began to consume all of his time and attention and he became increasingly ineffective as President.

The investigation took a dramatic turn in the summer of 1973 as the Senate Watergate Committee held public hearings into the scandal, with numerous Nixon aides (notably John Dean, his former counsel) revealing presidential involvement in the cover-up. The committee learned from a seemingly minor witness, Alexander Butterfield, that there was a system in the White House that recorded Nixon's conversations. While previous presidents had recorded some of their conversations, Nixon used a self-operating system that recorded every conversation in the White House, including ones that implicated him. Pressure mounted on Nixon to turn the tapes over to Congress and special prosecutor Archibald Cox, but he refused on the grounds on executive privilege, offering to hand over redacted transcripts instead (and later offering to have them verified by longtime Senator John Stennis, who was both a Nixon supporter and partially deaf), which he said was necessary to prevent the exposure of sensitive information pertinent to national security. When Cox subpoenaed the White House for the tapes, Nixon moved to have him fired in what became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre," which also resulted in the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, for refusing to fire Cox. Around the same time, Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned on unrelated charges of bribery and tax evasion, further damaging Nixon's credibility Agnew was soon replaced by Gerald Ford, the House Minority Leader.

The firing of Cox brought America to the brink of a constitutional crisis, triggered widespread national outrage and Nixon's support cratered. The tug-of-war for the tapes reached the Supreme Court in Summer of 1974, which ordered they be released to investigators. The tapes ended up damaging Nixon twofold: first, by being a Smoking Gun which proved Nixon was personally involved in efforts to cover up the Watergate break-in, a process which began almost immediately after it happened second, by displaying Nixon's private tendency towards exceedingly foul language and disparaging comments towards political opponents, media figures and a variety of minority groups - most frequently, and notoriously, Jews. With Nixon's involvement now effectively established, the House of Representatives began the process of impeachment, with the Judiciary Committee voting in July to introduce three articles of impeachment to the full House. Knowing his fate was sealed, Nixon resigned the office on the morning of August 9, 1974, famously departing the White House via helicopter. Shortly thereafter, successor Gerald Ford pardoned Nixon of any and all crimes he committed during his own administration. In October 1974, after resigning from office, Nixon fell ill with phlebitis after consulting his doctors, who told him that if he didn't undergo surgery, he could die from the illness, Nixon reluctantly went under the knife and chose surgery, which extended his lifespan.

Nixon would undergo his final Redemption Quest to salvage his legacy through the famous Frost/Nixon interviews and his expertise of foreign affairs, which made him a sought-after commentator and valued, informal foreign policy adviser to succeeding administrations. Nixon urged Reagan to collaborate with the Soviets on space travel as a peace gesture, met Deng Xiaoping after Tiananmen Square to reiterate the U.S. government position, and while originally critical of Bill Clinton, congratulated the new President on his well-run campaign. Clinton was a Country Mouse and Southern governor who just arrived with his team from Arkansas, and his administration was facing a a rough start with the bulk of it, including the President himself, being novices to Washington. An Odd Friendship began, where Nixon advised Clinton on how to handle a volatile situation in Russia concerning American support for Boris Yeltsin (Nixon told Clinton to support him.) Clinton began to consult more frequently with Nixon. The Fallen Hero and Broken Ace would mentor the new President, and the two grew so close, a visibly distraught Clinton presided over Nixon's funeral services in 1994.

The combination of Nixon's many positive achievements with his abuses of power and the resulting distrust in government institutions has left him with a very complicated legacy. Reactions to his death in 1994 further illustrated how historians and the public had been struggling to understand how to view the disgraced President. It has been repeatedly expressed that had Watergate not occurred, Nixon could be easily ranked as one of America's greatest Presidents, especially regarding his achievements in foreign policy. Had Watergate not happened, his approval ratings were high enough that it is very likely he would have been elected anyway - the ultimate irony being that he would most likely never have been removed from power had he not been so desperate to ensure that didn't happen. However, opinion of him skews strongly negative and he has been consistently ranked as one of the worst Presidents in surveys of both scholars and the public. Posthumous allegations from one of his associates claiming that he wanted to suppress liberals and African-Americans via the war on drugs certainly didn't help, nor did recent confirmation of the long-standing rumors that he sabotaged the Paris Peace Talks to secure his election, and increased public knowledge and scholarly debate about his expansion of American military operations in Vietnam to Cambodia (where the North Vietnamese had already been basing themselves for years) and the lasting effects it had on the southeast Asian nation (some, mostly journalists without formal historical credentials, claim that it helped bring the Khmer Rouge to power, while historians emphasize the military situation, which was objectively unfavorable for the Khmer Rouge before the withdrawal and the subsequent March 1970 North Vietnamese invasion in support of their fellow communists). He has also been credited, or blamed depending on one's perspective, with cementing the conservative takeover of the Republican Party while pioneering the divisive rhetoric endemic to modern politics. He is effectively a persona non-grata in American politics and being a Nixon supporter today is about as socially acceptable as supporting the Westboro Baptist Church.

A major facet of Nixon's legacy is his endurance as the face of political corruption in America, as the Watergate scandal and his numerous abuses of power it revealed continue to outweigh any and all of his administration's positive achievements in the public conscience. Successor Gerald Ford's pardon of him generated widespread outrage and while Nixon again achieved good things as an elder statesman in The '80s, such as his role in arranging the historic Gorbachev-Reagan talks (accompanied by this famous cover of a 1986 issue of Newsweek&loz declaring "He's Back"), he never managed to shake off the legacy of Watergate. He has continued to serve as the prototype for a corrupt President in popular culture with the term "Nixonian" being been coined to describe behavior and abuses of power by politicians that are reminiscent of his. Whenever a President is caught up in a scandal, comparisons to Nixon are almost mandatory. This was particularly the case when Nixon served as the linchpin of the national debate over the impeachment of Bill Clinton in 1998: Allies argued that his misdeeds were petty when compared to Nixon's while opponents argued that Clinton was undermining the rule of law in a manner just as severe as Nixon's. The numerous scandals that shadowed Donald Trump and eventually led to his impeachment have yet again brought Nixon to the forefront of American political discussion.

Nixon has long been a subject of particular interest for presidential historians, and serves as the canonical example of a deeply conflicted leader who "could be considered both a failure and great or near-great" (Alan Brinkley). 1995's Nixon, starring Anthony Hopkins as the nation's 37th president, directed by Oliver Stone, is one of the more recent biopics done about his life, as well as one of the more controversial (with Stone being accused of being both too hard and too soft on Nixon, depending on who you ask). Biographers often see him as a "tragic" figure: a brilliant, driven and capable man who was undermined by his prejudices, paranoia, and emotional scars. Thanks to his particular brand of paranoid neuroses (among other things, his tapes include lengthy rants about people&mdash mainly part of the "liberal east-coast establishment"&mdash allegedly plotting against him), he's also been quite the fertile figure of study for psychologists. Also, he famously added a bowling alley to the White House.

Nixon's equally popular for fictional portrayals. One can even make the case that he and his Presidency is the most frequently depicted in popular culture as Historical Domain Character, far more than any office-holder other than Lincoln. One reason for this is that his presidency coincided with the politically charged period of the New Hollywood, where films like All the President's Men released a few years after Watergate cemented him in popular memory before the setting-in of the halo that earlier scandal-plagued presidents underwent. This ensured that films critical of Nixon established itself as a market for Hollywood. Ironic, since Nixon &mdash a Southern California native (indeed, he was the first person born on the West Coast to be President) note The only other one is Barack Obama, born in Hawaii (despite what the "birther" conspiracy theory may assert). The two other Presidents who had California as their home state were born in the Midwest (Herbert Hoover was born in Iowa Ronald Reagan was born in Illinois). &mdash was a huge movie buff and indeed provided tax cuts to the motion picture industry during the same period, creating the very conditions for this politically charged era of film history. While Nixon's unique appearance and idiosyncrasies make him such an appealing subject for caricature, it also makes it hard to find an actor who actually resembles him, at least by conventional standards of leading men.


Purging the Party of Patriots

The Eisenhower-Nixon team triumphed in the 1952 election by promising to stem Communist aggression abroad, root out Red infiltrators at home, and reverse the socialistic policies of the New Deal. The party platform promised:

"We shall eliminate from the State Department and from every Federal office, all, wherever they may be found, who share responsibility for the needless predicaments and perils in which we find ourselves. We shall also sever from the public payrolls the hordes of loafers, incompetents and unnecessary employees who clutter the administration of our foreign affairs . . . The Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements . . . We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places . . .

"We shall see to it that no treaty nor agreement with other countries deprives our citizens of the rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution . . . There are no Communists in the Republican party. . . . We never compromise with Communism and we have to expose it and eliminate it in government and American life. A Republican President will appoint only persons of unquestioned loyalty . . . Reduction of expenditures by the elimination of waste and extravagance so that the budget will be balanced and a general tax reduction can be made."

But all this was not to be. A former assisstant to J. Edgar Hoover, Dan Smoot, has declared:

"If Stevenson had won in 1952, the growing anti-Communist, anti-socialist, anti-world government sentiment of the people would have continued to grow with accelerated speed, because it was apparent that Stevenson meant a continuation of Truman's policies.

"But millions thought their revolt had succeeded when Eisenhower and Nixon were elected. Eisenhower and Nixon, riding into office on the crest of a great wave in the swelling anti-communist, anti-socialist movement, destroyed the movement by giving it lip service, while vigorously supporting the very policies they were elected to oppose."

Calling this "the most tragic irony in the history of America," Smoot continued by saying:

". . . The Eisenhower-Nixon team, elected in 1952 because it was considered strongly anti-communist, broke the back of the anti-communist movement in the United States!"

Given Ike's debt to FDR and the Insiders around him, this is not surprising. Exactly as George C. Marshall had been elevated to Chief of Staff, Ike was picked by the Roosevelt Administration in 1942 to be Allied Commander in North Africa, over the heads of 366 Army officers who outranked him. To contend that these were both coincidences is to insult all logic. How much Eisenhower owed to the Roosevelt Administration may be seen in the fact that he was only a Lieutenant Colonel at the outset of the war, and his career, like Marshall's, was considered a flop. In 1943, with the same backing that Marshall had, he became Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe.

History has shown that the man who bears the actual title of President of the United States is not always the man who really wields the power. Behind Woodrow Wilson there was Colonel House. Behind FDR was Harry Hopkins. Those who really ran the United States while Eisenhower was on the putting green were Sidney Weinberg, Milton Eisenhower (CFR), Sherman Adams (CFR), John Foster Dulles (CFR), and Paul Hoffman (CFR), all lifelong devoted Leftists. This group came to be known as the "Palace Guard."

The Hearst newspapers of July 6, 1953, over the byline of their Washington Bureau, said: "The man-behind-the-guns in the Eisenhower Administration is Sidney James Weinberg, Wall Street investment banker." Weinberg, until his recent death, was a partner in the international banking firm of Goldman, Sachs and Company. An article in the New Yorker magazine in 1956 pointed out:

"[Weinberg] has been a liaison between Wall Street and the White House ever since the inception of the New Deal. In the early '30's, he was among the few prominent men in big-money circles whom President Roosevelt could count on for support, and during both the 1932 and 1936 Presidential campaigns he was assistant treasurer of the Democratic National Committee."

The same article quotes Business Week as calling Weinberg "an ambassador between financiers and politicians," and says that:

". . . though largely unknown to the man in any street but Wall, [Weinberg] is among the nation's most influential citizens. In his role as a power behind the throne, he probably comes as close as Bernard Baruch."

Continuing, the New Yorker article observes: "There is hardly a ramification of the money and credit business in which Goldman, Sachs is not active." In FDR's administration Weinberg was one of the organizers of the Business Advisory Council, an unofficial arm of the Council on Foreign Relations created to get the approval of businessmen for the New Deal.

A hallmark of the true Insider is that he is equally at home in either political party, since he knows that while the parties talk a slightly different language they are controlled by the same people. In 1940, having supposedly concluded that a third term for FDR was unsound, "Weinberg popped up as a founder of and diligent fund-raiser for the Democrats for Willkie."

In 1951, Weinberg became a financial backer of Republican Advance, the ADA of the Republican party. In 1952, Republican Advance, of which, it will be remembered, Richard Nixon was a charter member, changed its name to Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon, and Weinberg became its treasurer. Was it very difficult for this super-insider to infiltrate the Republican Party? Not at all. "The Republicans are not very bright," observed Weinberg. The New Yorker article informed us:

"When Eisenhower was President-elect, he asked three trusted and well-informed agents—Lucius Clay [CFR], Sherman Adams [CFR] and Herbert Brownell [CFR]—to draw up a list of recommendations for the cabinet he would have to appoint. These three men, in a sense, were acting as Eisenhower's advisors, but in this complex political age even advisors need advisors, and among those the trio turned to was, most notably, Weinberg."

Goaded by his mysterious backers, Ike began purging Conservatives from the Republican Party instead of Communists from the government. First to feel the wrath of the "New" Republicans were the followers of Robert Taft. The Taft-Conservative wing of the party had closed ranks behind the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, thanks largely to the work of Nixon, despite the fact that following the convention Eisenhower's advisor and intimate, Paul Hoffman, had returned to Pasadena and held a press conference, at which he said, in substance, according to a story by Morrie Ryskind: "The GOP has finally rid itself of the Taft incubus, and our job now is to get rid of all the Taft adherents."

After helping to defeat Adlai Stevenson handily. Conservatives hoped that Eisenhower would appoint some Taft supporters to key cabinet positions, to implement the promises of the Republican Party platform. But the only Taft supporter to be appointed to the cabinet was Ezra Taft Benson, who served in the post of Secretary of Agriculture. Former Republican Congressman Howard Buffett explained how cleverly Conservatives were being purged in the Eisenhower Administration:

"During Ike's first weeks in office, a list of Taft Republicans to be purged was prepared at the White House. In this strategy the Modern [Liberal] Republicans did not make Roosevelt's mistake in announcing their aims. Instead they laid their plans secretly and no public exposure of their tactics ever appeared. The frequent disappearance of conservative Republicans from public office and political influence in the following years was mute testimony to the effectiveness of this liquidation policy."

It had not taken Bob Taft long to read the handwriting on the Eisenhower Administration's wall. In the White House on April 30, 1953, before a dozen Congressmen and others, Taft told Eisenhower:

"You're taking us right down the same road that Truman traveled. It's a repudiation of everything we promised in the [1952] campaign."

Instead of building his administration around Conservatives and anti-Communists, Eisenhower continued the reign of the CFR members who had controlled the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. CFR members holding key slots in the Eisenhower Administration included:

  • President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower
  • Vice President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon
  • Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen W. Dulles
  • Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
  • Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter (succeeding John Foster Dulles)
  • Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson
  • Secretary of the Navy, Thomas S. Gates
  • Secretary of Labor, James P. Mitchell
  • Secretary of Commerce, Lewis L. Strauss
  • Under Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Nelson A. Rockefeller
  • Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray
  • Special Assistant to the President, James R. Killian Jr.
  • Staff Secretary to the President, Brig. Gen. A.J. Goodpaster, USA
  • Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Douglas Dillon
  • Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,Robert Murphy
  • Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant
  • Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph C. Satterthwaite
  • Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Francis O. Wilcox
  • U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge
  • Atomic Energy Commission, John A. McCone and
  • U.S. Representative on Disarmament, James J. Wadsworth.

The Republican Party platform of 1952 had stated: "We shall eliminate from the State Department and from every Federal office, all, wherever they may be found, who share responsibility for the needless predicaments and perils in which we find ourselves."

The "Palace Guard" carried this plank out—and buried it. Instead of eliminating those in the State Department responsible for Yalta, China, and other tragic disasters, the Eisenhower Administration promoted to Secretary of State one of the individuals who were most responsible, John Foster Dulles. Dulles had been a protege of Colonel House and was a founder of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was also a protege of Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State on whose record of successive losses for America the Republicans had based much of their campaign against the Democrats. Senator William Jenner of Indiana wrote: "Mr. Dulles is Mr. Acheson's identical twin." Dulles had become officially a right-hand man of Acheson in 1950, and was so completely a part of the Truman foreign policy menagerie that he no longer gave his address to Who's Who in America as 48 Wall Street, New York, where his law office was, but as "Department of State, Washington."

Dulles was a strange individual to oversee the promised clean-up of the State Department. The appointment of Dulles as Secretary of State appeared strange and disillusioning even to William F. Buckley Jr., who wrote in Human Events of April 18, 1953:

"The principal reason why the Senate and the people should have no confidence in Dulles on matters relating to loyalty and security is his reversal, in February, of the Civil Service Loyalty Board's findings that a 'reasonable doubt' does indeed exist as to John Carter Vincent's loyalty. Not only did Dulles overrule this highly cautious board, he also exonerated Vincent on the lesser, looser, laxer score by declaring that neither is there 'reasonable doubt' that Vincent is a security risk. Now, the evidence against Vincent, garnered from a study of his career, is very persuasive . . .

"But even apart from Vincent's activities and associations in China, there is the testimony of Louis Budenz, who asserts that he knew Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party . . .Mr. Dulles in effect declared that there is no reasonable doubt that Louis Budenz is a liar. And this in spite of the fact that on the basis of thousands of pages of secret testimony, corroborating wherever possible, the FBI gives Budenz the highest reliability rating . . . Mr. Dulles dealt the federal security program . . . an Achesonian blow."

It was John Foster Dulles, then, who was appointed by Ike, or for Ike, to clean the security risks out of the State Department and to put a termination to the "America last" CFR foreign policy, as had been promised in the 1952 Republican Party platform. It has been observed of Dulles that he always said the right thing and always did the wrong one. In speeches and public statements, Dulles was always the proponent of the real American position, the man who announced the policies and intentions which the American people wanted to hear and which they recognized as right. The American people for the most part were not aware that he did just the opposite of what he proclaimed. But that, one must remember, is the way the Insiders operate.

During World War II Dulles was appointed chairman of the "Federal Council of Churches' Inter-Church Commission to Study the Bases of the Just and Durable Peace". In early March of 1942, that organization held a conference at Delaware, Ohio. Chairman John Foster Dulles submitted the report, which had been approved by the members of his committee. It included the following recommendations:

  • One, ultimately a world government of delegated powers
  • Two, complete abandonment of United States isolationism
  • Three, strong, immediate limitations on national sovereignty
  • Four, international control of all armies and navies
  • Five, a universal system of money
  • Six, world-wide freedom of immigration
  • Seven, progressive elimination of all tariff and quota restrictions on world trade
  • Eight, a democratically controlled international bank.

Chairman Dulles, an in-law of the Rockefellers and long-time attorney for the international bankers, placed on the United States much of the blame for the Second World War. His report said:

"It should be a matter of shame and humiliation to us that actually the influences shaping the world have largely been irresponsible forces. The natural wealth of the world is not evenly distributed. Accordingly, the possession of such natural resources . . . is a grant to be discharged in the general interest."

Time magazine of March 16, 1942, which carried under Dulles' picture the caption, "Shame on U.S.," stated:

"Some of the conference's economic opinions are almost as sensational as the extreme internationalism of its political program.

"It held that a 'new order of economic life is both imminent and imperative'—a new order that is sure to come either 'through voluntary cooperation within the framework of democracy or through explosive political revolution.' Without condemning the profit motive as such, it denounced various defects in the profit system for breeding war, demagogues and dictators, 'mass unemployment, widespread dispossession from homes and farms, destitution, lack of opportunity for youth and of security for old age.' Instead, 'the church must demand economic arrangements measured by human welfare . . . '"

Dulles was a prominent and much publicized member of the first meeting of the World Council of Churches, held in Amsterdam in 1948, at which that body officially declared capitalism to be just as evil as Communism. Dulles neither protested nor disavowed the resolution.

An idea of what John Foster Dulles had in mind in his pursuit of American foreign policy was given in U.S. News & World Report, December 28, 1956, where Dulles said: "It is very important that this satellite situation should develop in a way that the Soviet Union is surrounded by friendly countries." Commenting upon an earlier similar statement, Frank Meyer, now of National Review magazine, wrote:

"Surely if the administration had the faintest sense of reality about the character of the struggle, the tightest possible encirclement of the Soviet Union by the most hostile peoples would be one of our first aims. What is Secretary Dulles saying? That any friends we have in the periphery of the Soviet empire are to be sacrificed to the Russian desire for captive neighbors? How does this differ from the policy of Yalta, the sellout of Poland in 1945?"

You will recall that during the 1952 campaign, Nixon had called the Truman-Acheson policy of "containment" of Communism "cowardly." Under Dulles the Eisenhower Administration did not repudiate the Yalta agreements as promised in the platform, but instead repudiated any repudiation of the agreements. Since Dulles was a founder of 'the Council on Foreign Relations it is not surprising that he was a strong supporter of Atlantic Union, which advocates changing NATO from a defense alliance into a complete political union. The San Francisco Examiner of May 4, 1956, called Dulles' program "world government in disguise," and said that Eisenhower "fully supports the 'Dulles plan.'"

Despite the fact that Nixon had achieved great political mileage out of horsewhipping Dean Acheson for his, at best, badly mistaken policies towards Communism, he quickly gravitated toward Acheson's protege, Dulles. Writing in Look magazine, Earl Mazo was to note:

"Only a few have known that the relationship between Nixon and Dulles was perhaps the warmest in the Administration . . . Dulles was Nixon's behind the scenes adviser in many cases, especially during Eisenhower's illness."

It is not surprising that Nixon would feel an affinity for Dulles. Both possessed the ability to project a public image which ran quite counter to their actions. But sophisticated Washington watchers must have laughed to see the supposedly militant anti-Communist Nixon cozy up to Acheson's sidekick, Dulles. Acheson, in 1971 an unofficial Nixon adviser, was Nixon's favorite target in 1952, with statements like this:

"Stevenson himself hasn't even backbone training, for he is a graduate of Dean Acheson's spineless school of diplomacy which cost the free world six hundred million former allies in the past seven years of Trumanism."

Four days later Nixon again linked Stevenson with Acheson, the man who said he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss after Hiss was convicted of perjury regarding his activities in spying for the USSR:

"[Stevenson's] entire record shows that he is incurably afflicted with Acheson color-blindness—a form of pinkeye—toward the Red threat."

While campaigning for the Presidency in 1952, Ike told a Milwaukee audience that Communism had:

". . . insinuated itself into our schools . . . and our government itself. What did this contamination into government mean? It meant contamination to some degree of virtually every section of our government . . . We have all had enough, I believe, of those who have sneered at the warnings of men trying to drive Communists from high places—but who themselves have never had the sense or the stamina to take after the Communists themselves . . ."

Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, started to expose some of the Communist influence in the Truman Administration. One week after Brownell's public revelation about Communist spy Harry Dexter White in 1953, he was silenced. Brownell got the picture. The exposures ceased.

After promising to investigate the Communists in "every department," Eisenhower let stand an order issued by Truman in 1947, prohibiting access by Congress to government files on the loyalty of personnel. Another 1948 directive by Truman forbidding government officials to give information to Congressional committees without White House permission was also left standing by Eisenhower. And on Friday, May 17, 1954, Eisenhower issued an order forbidding government departments to provide any information to investigating committees, which went far beyond the Truman "gag" rule. Chairman Francis Walter of the House Committee on Un-American Activities called the Eisenhower Executive Order "incredibly stupid."

No one, apparently, considered that from the standpoint of the Insiders the move was incredibly smart. Congressional committees were now, for all practical purposes, out of the business of investigating Communists and other subversives in the government—in complete repudiation of Eisenhower's campaign promises. This was also a complete repudiation of the idea that the American public has the right to know what its government is doing. As early as October 18, 1953, after campaigning on promises to clean the Communists out of the government, Eisenhower told a news conference that he hoped the whole security issue of Communists in government would be "a matter of history and memory by the time the next election comes around." He deplored the fear of Communism in government and "the suspicion on the part of the American people that their government services are weak in this regard."

The "great crusade" that Eisenhower during his campaign had promised to lead turned out to be a pied piper's pipe dream. The "Communist threat" disappeared under Eisenhower just as the "missile gap" did right after John F. Kennedy's election. Eisenhower did, however, lead one "crusade": the crusade to "get" Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. Human Events stated:

"It is now obvious the Administration, striving desperately to down Senator McCarthy, has embarked upon a series of moves which, if successful, will take the nation a long way toward dictatorial government. These moves are depicted as an effort of President Eisenhower to shield himself from a McCarthy "domination" of the Republican party which, of course, is sheer moonshine. Back of these moves are the leftwing groups that have successfully penetrated the Republican party and who see in Senator McCarthy a chance to build an omnipotent executive who will have the power to hasten the establishment of a Socialist state in America."

McCarthy had been tolerated during the 1952 campaign, even though Eisenhower's backers despised him, because at that time the monumental smear job against him had been largely ineffective. In 1952, McCarthy had more supporters than detractors. In the years since then little has been said in defense of McCarthy, but the Liberal Establishment has continued to defame him to such a point that today there is hardly an American who does not believe that the Wisconsin Senator made outlandish and unprovable charges.

As it became obvious that Acheson's old subordinate, John Foster Dulles, had no intention of carrying out the campaign promises of Eisenhower and Nixon to clean out the State Department, McCarthy began to turn the heat on the Eisenhower administration. The ex-Marine was proving to be disturbingly nonpartisan on the Communist infiltration issue. Nixon was assigned to try to divert McCarthy onto other issues.

The Vice President had been a close friend of McCarthy's, and McCarthy apparently trusted Nixon. For a while he toned down his attacks. Nixon is credited with persuading McCarthy to call off his threat to investigate the Central Intelligence Agency, which the Dulles brothers had been primarily responsible for founding. Nixon also talked McCarthy into firing J.B. Matthews as his chief investigator, after Matthews published a magazine article thoroughly documenting the depth of penetration by Communists of religious bodies, including the National Council of Churches, and the success with which the Communists had enticed tens of thousands of non-Communist, liberal clergymen into joining their fronts. McCarthy was also upset with the Eisenhower Administration's position on relaxing aid and trade restrictions against the Iron Curtain countries. The Wisconsin Senator had written a scathing letter to Eisenhower on the subject, but Nixon persuaded McCarthy to let him intercept the letter before it reached the President.

The Vice President attempted to divert McCarthy's energies to other matters. He told the Wisconsin Senator: "You should not be known as a one-shot Senator." After visiting McCarthy in Florida, Nixon told reporters that McCarthy would turn his attention to Democratic corruption and away from the Communist issue. McCarthy apparently decided that whatever promises had been made to him that the Eisenhower administration would slowly and without fanfare get around to the "subversion in government" issue were not going to be kept. He denounced as a lie Nixon's statement to the press that McCarthy would lay off the Communism issue.

When it became obvious to the "Palace Guard" that Nixon could no longer control McCarthy, a way had to be found to engineer the Senator's downfall. The three most important men in arranging the destruction of McCarthy were William Rogers, then Assistant Attorney General and now Secretary of State Henry Cabot Lodge, currently Nixon's ambassador to the Vatican and Ford Foundation official Paul Hoffman. Fulton Lewis Jr. said:

"One man above all others in the White House family hated Joe McCarthy, and that man was Paul G. Hoffman, the President's confidante whom he named to the United Nations . . . Paul Hoffman, in his hatred, helped to pay for the lawyers who drew up the censure charges which Senator Flanders of Vermont lodged against Senator McCarthy, and which finally—though proven to be false—resulted in McCarthy's censure.[Hoffman was the darling of the United World Federalists, of whom Flanders was one.]

"On July 19th of last year, Senator Flanders openly admitted this act on the floor of the United States Senate, at that time he publicly apologized to Senator McCarthy for what he had done. He said he wished the whole thing could be forgotten, but he did admit that Mr. Hoffman contributed $1,000 for the drafting of those false charges.

"Hoffman, who hated Taft, McCarthy and all the anti-communists with a passion, you will remember, married a Communist. [Hoffman's wife is Anna Rosenberg, who has been the public relations brains behind Nelson Rockefeller's political career.] What the "Palace Guard" was attempting to do was to make the White House into a Bergen with only Charlie McCarthys in Congress, not Joe McCarthys."

In his article for Colliers magazine, "How Ike Saved the Republican Party," Hoffman had made it plain that McCarthy and the anti-Communists were to be purged from the party. He said:

"[McCarthy and his group were] creating the illusion both at home and abroad that the Republican party was anti-Communist and nothing else, that it had lost its interest in the quest for peace abroad and for human welfare at home. Such a negative image of the Republican party could prove disastrous if the Republican party were to win, it had to be for something."

The reason the Eisenhower Administration was so eager to get McCarthy was not merely that he was exposing subversives who had infiltrated the government bureaucracy, but that following the trail of the lower echelon conspirators had led him to start knocking at the doors of the upper-level conspirators of the so-called "legitimate world." When McCarthy began making the connection between the Communists and the penthouse conspirators above them, his career was doomed. The same was true of the Reece Committee, which had been investigating foundations until the probe was killed on orders from Eisenhower. Whenever any government investigation gets above the level of exposing the gutter revolutionaries and begins following the trail to the "legitimate world," the investigation is always quashed.

Although the issue of Communist infiltration of government, which the Republicans had used to get elected in 1952, was buried as soon as they assumed office (and McCarthy with it, when he attempted to force the Republicans to carry out their campaign promises), it was resurrected for the 1954 off-year elections. Nixon was used again, as he had been in 1952, as a Judas goat, to lead naive anti-Communist sheep into the "New" Republicans' ideological slaughterhouse. This time Nixon claimed that the Eisenhower Administration had rooted the Reds out of government. In Omaha on September 20, 1954, Nixon stated:

"[The Eisenhower Administration is] kicking Communists, fellow travelers, and bad security risks out of the federal government by the thousands. The Communist conspiracy is being smashed to bits by this administration . . . Previous Democratic administrations underestimated the Communist danger at home and ignored it. They covered up rather than cleaned up."

A week later at New Bedford, Massachusetts, Nixon again claimed:

"We have driven the Communists, the fellow-travelers, and the security risks out of government by the thousands."

Soon, Nixon began playing the numbers game as he toured the country campaigning for Republican office seekers. The number of ousted "security risks" escalated from 1,456 to 2,200 to 2,429 to 2,486, and then climaxed at 6,926. Using this figure, Nixon told an audience in Rock Island, Illinois, on October 21:

"The President's security risk program resulted in 6,926 individuals removed from the federal service . . . The great majority of these individuals were inherited largely from the Truman regime . . . . Included in this number were individuals who were members of the Communist Party and Communist controlled organizations."

These individuals numbered 1,743, according to Nixon. The Vice President went so far as to assert November 1, in Denver, Colorado, that:

"96 percent of the 6,926 Communists, fellow travelers, sex perverts, people with criminal records, dope addicts, drunks, and other security risks removed under the Eisenhower security program were hired by the Truman administration."

Fifteen months later the Eisenhower-appointed Civil Service Chairman Philip Young informed a Senate committee that a subsequent survey showed that 41.2 percent of the dismissed or resigned security risks actually had been hired after Eisenhower had taken over the executive department from the Democrats. Since Eisenhower had been in office for so short a time, it would appear that things were getting worse under Ike than they had been under Truman. Young had earlier testified that he knew of no single government employee who had been fired by the Eisenhower Administration for being a Communist or fellow traveler! During Truman's last full year, the administration fired 21,626 for cause. Nixon's claims were clearly fraudulent, but they did make for exciting campaign rhetoric. His boss had made investigation of Communist penetration in government a dead letter by continuing Truman's gag rule.

By the 1956 campaign Nixon was burying the issue entirely. On October 17, Nixon told an audience at Cornell University, according to the Associated Press, that investigations of Communist activities of the kind formerly conducted by McCarthy were no longer needed. He gave credit to the Eisenhower Administration's security policies for taking "this issue . . . out of the political arena." In a sense he was telling the truth. The issue had been taken out of the political arena. The Democrats certainly weren't going to bring it up if the Republicans didn't. Yet seventeen days earlier, in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Nixon had asserted that the GOP would never do what it soon did. According to the Vice President:

"We will never underestimate or pooh-pooh the Communist danger, either abroad or in the United States of America. . . In a political campaign, it is tempting to tell the American people that we can get rid of our draft, cut our defenses, find a cut-rate way to meet our international obligations, but American security must come before any political ambitions."

What made Nixon's burial of the internal subversion issue all the more ironic was his earlier claim that the Democrats had buried it, as in this September 21, 1948 statement: "The full story of Communist espionage will not be told until we get a Republican President who is not afraid of skeletons in the closet." Nixon advanced his own career with statements like the following, made shortly before he ran for the Senate:

"Because they treated Communist infiltration into our American institutions like any ordinary petty political scandal, the [Truman] Administration officials responsible for this failure to act against the Communist conspiracy rendered the greatest possible disservice to the people of this nation."

This was made all the more significant because Elizabeth Bentley, who had served as a courier for the Communist party, had testified that of the many Communist cells in the U.S. government, only two, the Silvermaster and Perlo cells, had been partially uncovered. It should be duly noted that Nixon had full knowledge of the depth and extent of Communist penetration of the government from his activities on the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Hiss case. To tell the American public that the issue was dead can only be described as deceitful, although it doubtless enhanced his stock among the Insiders, to whom he was catering in every possible way.

Another extremely important issue that Nixon used to sabotage Conservatives and anti-Communists was the Bricker Amendment. The Bricker Amendment was framed by Ohio Senator John Bricker, who was concerned that treaties entered into by the President superseded the Constitution. His argument was based on a statement made by John Foster Dulles before the American Bar Association in Louisville in April 1952. Dulles had discussed the status of treaties in international law and under the Constitution. He pointed out that the Constitution specifically says (Article VI) that approved treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land." He added that such treaties "are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitution."

The Bricker Amendment forbade the President to enter into any treaty that would supersede the Constitution of the United States and deny to any citizen the rights guaranteed by it. One would assume that no elected official could oppose the Bricker Amendment. The Amendment was specifically aimed at the United Nations Charter, which is a treaty. Bricker feared we were headed for "socialism by treaty" through the United Nations. Under the Bricker Amendment, it would be impossible to surrender our sovereignty to a world government by treaty.

Naturally, the Amendment was anathema to all the world government clan, the CFR in particular. It was denounced as an attempt to undermine the treaty-making power of the President—which it was, assuming that the President sought to enter into a treaty that would violate the Constitutional rights of Americans. Eisenhower fought the Bricker Amendment bitterly right down to its hairline defeat on the Senate floor, denouncing its supporters as "nuts and crackpots." The man responsible for the defeat of the Bricker Amendment was Richard M. Nixon.

While in the Senate, Nixon had favored the Amendment, but as a hatchetman for the Eisenhower Administration, he worked for the defeat of this crucially important bill. White House correspondent William Costello wrote:

"The Bricker amendment . . . called for Nixon's best talents. The White House set itself adamantly against the amendment's proposed limitation on the President's treaty-making powers, and it was Nixon who brought the report that sentiment both in and out of Congress was more sympathetic to Bricker than the President had supposed. The Vice President, after first proposing compromise, found himself in loyalty to the White House stalling. placating, instructing, and negotiating and finally joined Eisenhower in opposition to Bricker's demand."

The Bricker Amendment lost in the Senate by a single vote. Some day Americans may realize how crucial that betrayal of the Constitution was.

The Vice President made a convincing "yes man" for the Eisenhower-Dulles version of the Truman-Acheson appeasement of the Communist program. Nixon's support of such anti-anti-Communist programs helped drown resistance to them.

On March 17, 1960, Eisenhower told Los Angeles Times reporter Don Shannon: "So far as I know, there has never been a specific difference in our points of view on any important problems in seven years."

Ultra-Liberal columnist Marquis Childs (CFR) quoted Nixon as stating: "My beliefs are very close, as it has turned out, to the philosophy of the Eisenhower Administration on both foreign and domestic policy." Mr. Childs added: "In embracing the Eisenhower philosophy and the "new Republicanism", Nixon has gone against his own conservative voting record when he was in the Senate and House." Taking the Vice President at his word, we see that he supported the Eisenhower policies of:

  • Keeping Chiang Kai-shek's troops bottled up on Formosa while settling for an armistice in Korea
  • Surrendering North Vietnam to Ho chi Minh by refusing to permit an air strike against the Communist armies surrounding the French at Dien Bien Phu
  • Repudiating the platform promise to repudiate the Yalta betrayal
  • Turning the Suez Canal over to the Communists
  • Betraying our promise to help the Hungarians if they revolted
  • Inviting Khrushchev, the Butcher of Budapest, to visit America just after he had finished slaughtering freedomseeking Hungarians
  • Accepting as a policy the Communists' proposal for "peaceful co-existence," which by their own admission means conquering the world by subversion and civil wars and
  • Allowing a Communist bastion to be established ninety miles from our shore.

All of these events were critical, with long-term implications that still affect us today.

In order to ingratiate himself with the International Left, Nixon did such things as escort the notorious Indonesian Communist Achmed Sukarno around the capital and introduce him to the Senate as the George Washington of Indonesia. He did the same for Fidel Castro. Although our military intelligence, our ambassadors to Cuba and Mexico, and all of South America had known for years that Castro was a Communist and had tried to so inform our government, Nixon did his best to try to keep up the pretense that Castro was just another of those George Washingtons.

On April 18, 1959, Vice President Nixon stated: "[The] Cuban people themselves will not tolerate a Communist government or a Communist takeover." Five days later, in an address to newspaper editors, he remarked:

"I mentioned Dr. Castro's visit, and I am looking forward to the opportunity of seeing him tomorrow in my office . . . No one can come to the United States, no one can talk to American audiences, no one can talk to the officials of our government, as Dr. Castro will have, without going back convinced that the U.S. government and people share whole-heartedly the aspirations of the people of Latin America for peaceful existence, for Democratic freedom, for economic progress, and for the strengthening of the institutions of representative government."

Nixon vocally supported extending foreign aid to Communist Poland and the Cultural Exchange Program, despite the fact that J. Edgar Hoover had warned that the latter was a ruse for smuggling spies into the country. Nixon proved to be an excellent tranquilizer for Conservative Republicans while Eisenhower and the "Palace Guard" tugged and hauled the party Leftward.

One of the major themes of the 1952 Eisenhower-Nixon campaign had been a pledge to reverse the onrushing movement towards socialism. In those days Republicans used the word "socialism" to describe the program of the Democrats. Today, since Eisenhower and Nixon adopted the Democrats' programs, the word is as thoroughly taboo among Republicans as it is among Democrats. Pollster Samuel Lubell observes that "to solidify itself permanently in American life the New Deal needed at least one Republican victory . . . [which would] endorse much of the New Deal through the simple device of leaving things untouched." That is exactly what the Eisenhower Administration did. As M. Stanton Evans, editor of the Indianapolis Star, has written:

"One result of this was to alienate from the party the new majority which had temporarily surfaced in 1952: the taxpayers and homeowners who looked to the Republicans for relief, and who were rudely disappointed as augmented federal spending and taxes shifted the cost of government more heavily on them than before. In consequence the GOP emerged from the White House with little to show for its eight years' occupancy: a party base more shrunken than ever, repeated defeats in the battles for Congress, and no strategy for reversing things."

In 1950, middle-class Americans paid thirty-three percent of the total tax burden. By 1958, they found themselves paying forty-seven percent of it. By the end of Ike's career the federal government owned three million more acres of land in the continental United States than it had when he was inaugurated. During the Eisenhower years federal employment continued to climb and bureaus to expand. While Ike was getting publicity for paring personnel in one place, he was quietly adding more in other places, resulting in large net gains in federal employment—breaking yet another of his campaign pledges. Eisenhower's proposed budget for 1957-58 called for domestic spending of $31 billion, against the highest figure under Truman, who had the Korean War to finance, of $20 billion.

Under Eisenhower the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was created, a department which Republicans and Conservative Democrats had successfully kept the ADA crowd from creating under either Roosevelt or Truman. HEW has now grown into the most expensive department in the federal government.

During the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration the national debt increased by almost $27 billion. Truman, in seven budgets, had increased the national debt by only $5 1/2 billion, in spite of the fact that he had a full-blown Korean War to deal with. In April 1957, Norman Thomas, six times candidate for President on the Socialist Party ticket, stated: "The United States is making greater strides towards socialism under Eisenhower than even under Roosevelt."

Result of all this the Republican party was swept under in the 1958 elections, sustaining a defeat second only to the disaster of 1936 in modern Republican history.

Nixon had been, as Paul Hoffman said, a faithful servant of the Eisenhower Administration. His job had been to quash any revolt by the rank and file against Ike's socialism by making strong public statements, just as Vice President Agnew has done for Nixon. When he was out speechifying, Nixon sounded as hard-core as ever. During his campaigning in 1954, he was still castigating the Democratic program as socialism. "A Democratic victory," he said, "will mean a sharp turn to the left, back down the road to socialism." He told a group of the faithful in Van Nuys, California: "When the Eisenhower Administration came to Washington on January 20, 1953, we found in the files a virtual blueprint for socializing America." The Democratic plans, he stated, "call for socialized medicine, socialized housing, socialized agriculture, socialized water and power and perhaps most disturbing of all, socialization of America's greatest source of power, atomic energy."

The Vice President really became carried away one night and blurted out this statement: ". . . speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, a great Republican Chief Justice, Earl Warren, has ordered an end to racial segregation in the nation's public schools."

But pacifying grass-roots Republicans with Conservative rhetoric was not Nixon's only job in the Eisenhower Administration. He worked behind the scenes, pushing and shoving recalcitrant Republican Congressmen and Senators into supporting the "New Republicanism" of Ike and his "Palace Guard."

The Council on Foreign Relations and the "Palace Guard" had done their job well. During the entire Eisenhower Administration there was no interruption of "America last" policies abroad and the welfare state at home. The Insiders had proved that they could not only control the selection of Republican Presidential candidates, but could actually control a Republican administration.

In one respect the Eisenhower Administration was a monumental success: it was undeniably successful at purging Conservatives from the party. Ike's "confidante," Paul Hoffman in his October 1956 article in Colliers, laid out in the very bluntest terms the strategy for purging Conservatives from the Republican party.

On February 16, 1957, Human Events reported that Hoffman claimed that the White House had suggested the idea of the article and that he "wrote a draft and submitted it to members of the Palace Guard. The latter returned it to him, saying it was not strong enough and urging him to name names. Hoffman acceded to this request and the Colliers piece appeared in print in a new and tougher version, with the names."

Hoffman admitted that, when Eisenhower was elected, only "thirty percent of the local and county leaders of the party and less than twenty percent of the Congressmen and Senators" within the Republican Party supported Eisenhower's Liberal foreign and domestic policies. Eisenhower was upset, Hoffman said, because even as leader of the ticket he could not control all Republicans. He stated: "What Eisenhower did not grasp was the entrenched power of some of the greater figures on Capitol Hill and how deep and firm were the rusty, old-fashioned convictions in which they believed."

If you wanted to make progress within the new Republican establishment, you had to sell out and go Liberal. Hoffman quoted Charles Halleck as shaking his head and saying: "I had to swallow hard two or three times because the boss believes in things I don't, but he's the boss . . ." Halleck soon got the picture. "You have to go along to get along," as the politicians say. Hoffman wrote: "By now, I should add, Charlie Halleck has turned out to be a tower of strength for the Eisenhower program."

Hoffman admitted in the Colliers article that during the Eisenhower regime Conservative Republicans were moved out and Liberals in. He said:

"Forty-two new state chairmen of the Republican party are new, solid, Eisenhower men. Eighty-five of the one hundred forty-six members of the national committee in 1952, have been replaced by new faces. In state after state the young men and women [many of them Democrats] first brought into politics through the Citizens for Eisenhower have begun to occupy commanding posts in the regular structure. There are, to be sure, areas where the old guard still retains its control . . . But by and large, the nature of the party in 1956, is almost totally different from what it was in 1952—either in personalities, or in philosophy of Republican stalwarts. We have come to accept Eisenhower leadership wholeheartedly."

"Eisenhower's overriding political directive to Leonard Hall, our national chairman, is to find young people, new people of the Citizens for Eisenhower stripe and bring them into the organization. This fall, in New York and Wisconsin, bitter intra-party fights for the Republican Senatorial nomination in these great states have been won by two distinguished liberals, [Communist Party protege] Jacob Javits and Alexander Wiley—both of them 100% Eisenhower men—over opposition from the right wing."

"This is not to say that the battle to remake the Republican Party is entirely won," wrote Hoffman. "There still remains . . . the Senate, where years of power built up men whose entrenched positions still let them resist the philosophy of the Twentieth Century." Then Hoffman continued:

"In the Senate, there are too many Republican Senators claiming the label Republican who embrace none or very little of the Eisenhower program and philosophy. This group can be divided into two splinters. One splinter contains men like Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, Senator William Jenner of Indiana, Senator Herman Welker of Idaho, Senator George Malone of Nevada, who can be called the unappeasables. I shall not try to stigmatize the dangerous thinking and reckless conduct of these men except to say that, in my opinion, they have little place in the new Republican party.

"The other splinter within the dissident third [the conservative, anti-Communist one-third] consists of what I consider the "faint-hope" group: men like Senator Henry Dworshak of Idaho, Senator Andrew Schoeppel of Kansas, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. This splinter has been unable to demonstrate, conclusively and permanently, that it accepts the modern America with its needs of social security or balanced labor-management relations, or government partnership and guardianship of our complex economy. Nor, being still wedded to the old-fashioned idea of fortress-America-isolated-in-space, can it accept America's role as the chief champion of peace and decency in active international relations."

All of the Senators except Goldwater soon met their political Waterloo. Is it rational to believe that this article would have appeared in Colliers magazine without the prior approval of Eisenhower and the "Palace Guard?" Could Hoffman's message have been any clearer? There is no room in the "modern" Republican Party for Conservatives. All the "modern" Republicans want from Conservatives is their vote on election day.

In the same article, however, Hoffman did have praise for one Republican:

"In the Senate, from the very beginning, the President's program has had the unqualified and vigorous support of Vice President Nixon. Some liberal Republicans are still unconvinced as to the Vice President's attitude, holding that he had supported the program only out of personal loyalty to the President, and that his original ultra-conservative views are unchanged. Based on what Nixon has said both publicly and privately, it is my view that he genuinely and deeply believes—that the Eisenhower program is best for the country".

On September 15, 1954, Human Events had charged that no administration in history had so strikingly disregarded party loyalty in job appointments, many key positions having gone to CFR Democrats. Eisenhower also succeeded in destroying a coalition of Southern Conservative Democrats and Northern Republicans that had blocked much socialist legislation. Now Republicans were put in the position of being traitors if they did not support the Eisenhower Administration's programs. The Chicago Tribune of January 1, 1958, commented editorially:

"The fact is that the Republican party, as it has developed, or, more properly, degenerated under Mr. Eisenhower and his Palace Guard, now stands for pretty nearly everything that can be found in unadulterated form under a Democratic wrapper. The great achievement of the occupant of the White House, if such it can be called, is to have destroyed the Republican party as a repository for any recognizable body of orthodox doctrine."

The elections of 1954, 1956, and 1958 were Republican debacles, except for Eisenhower's personal success in 1956. As Theodore White observed:

"Divorced from the personal curing power of his great name, in each measurable off-year Congressional election under his administration, the Republican party lost ground . . . With the Democratic triumph in the election of 1958, the fortunes of the Republican party, as a party, had sunk to their lowest ebb since the zenith of the New Deal in 1936."

While Republican candidates were being defeated, Eisenhower never campaigned for any other Republican, with the exception of the ultra-ultra-Liberal Clifford Case (CFR), when he ran for the Senate in 1954. So successful was Ike at purging Conservatives from the GOP that at the end of the 1958 elections Harold Lavine, senior editor of Newsweek, wrote:

"Eisenhower has succeeded where Roosevelt and Truman failed . . . The Republican party is a thoroughly demoralized body . . . Republican morale has been able to sustain five successive defeats, but it has crumbled completely as a result of Eisenhower's two great victories."

Eisenhower made no bones about the fact that there were no ideological differences, as far as he was concerned, between the two parties. Since he was really a Liberal Democrat who became a Liberal Republican only in order to run for the Presidency, this is not surprising. Writing in the Saturday Evening Post, Eisenhower stated his philosophy that the Republican party had a better delivery system for socialism.

"The difference between parties is, in most instances, a matter of approach to problems and programs. We Republicans want our government at appropriate levels to be responsive to our needs, but not to invade our individual rights, liberties, and responsibilities. Though we have many of the same ultimate goals as the Democrats, we disagree with them on methods and in their application, believing that ours are safer and more effective in preserving individual rights, responsibilities, and initiatives, which, after all, are the basis of self-government."

Conservative strength at the national level of the Republican party was decimated by the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration, so that when the grass-roots Conservative groundswell of the 1960's developed, it was strictly at the local level, with little support within the national party machinery. The result of eight years of Eisenhower-Nixon was that the New Deal had not only been saved from threatened extinction, but had been expanded. William F. Buckley Jr. wrote in 1958:

". . . The passion to federalize social and economic functions is as ardent today as it was in 1952, and beyond a few ritualistic rhetorical dampeners, Mr. Eisenhower has done nothing to check it. The problem of internal security, on the way to a solution when Mr. Eisenhower was elected, has, by his inattention, relapsed to a state worse than that under Mr. Truman. The labor barons, who posed in 1952 an acute problem understood by Senator Taft, have waxed stronger in five years, and have got virtual guarantees of non-interference from the Eisenhower Administration: for to interfere with them would mean to dig in and take a stand, and Eisenhower does not take stands, except against McCarthy and the Bricker Amendment . . ."

It is important to note from Mr. Buckley's concluding sentence that Mr. Eisenhower could be extremely tough and resolute when he wanted to be. Yet Mr. Buckley attributed Eisenhower's disastrous policies with regard to Communism to lack of understanding and will. Buckley wrote:

"There is no other intelligible explanation for Eisenhower's movements in the past five years than that he does not take the Communists at their word as to the aims of Communism. What man who knows Communism would have gone to Geneva to act as a sounding board for Communist propaganda? What man, having made the mistake of going, would have declared, the whole world breathless at his feet, that he believed the Communists—as he put it—'want peace as much as we do'?

"Where is the man who understands Communism who would say, as Eisenhower did at a press conference last summer, that '. . . I was very hard put to it when [Marshal Zhukov] insisted that [the Communist] system appealed to the idealistic, and we completely to the materialistic, and I had a very tough time trying to defend our position.

"Who except a man incapable of understanding Communism could, after so many demonstrations that the Communists mean exactly what their high priests say, permit the national policy to bog down one more time over so palpable a ruse as Marshal Bulganin's call for the one-millionth conference at which to 'reconcile the world's differences'? . . . The tranquil world of Mr. Eisenhower is the world in which the Communists are thriving."

Mr. Buckley ['Skull and Bones' Society] described the effect admirably and ignored the cause, i.e., that Dwight Eisenhower was the creation of the CFR and the men behind it, and was their willing tool if not their partner. Instead of being in retreat after eight years of "Republican" leadership, the world Communist movement was stronger than ever. It even had a foothold on our own doorstep in Cuba, thanks to brother Milton Eisenhower and the uncleansed State Department, which ignored reports that Castro was a long-time Communist. The "crusade" that had been promised was never launched. Instead, it was business as usual, with a new group of operators running the same show for the same Insiders behind the scenes.

NOTE: Many people have tried to condone Eisenhower's sins by contending that he was too dumb to know what he was really doing, citing the tongue-tangled syntax he displayed at press conferences. Not so, says Garry Wills in his highly readable (but in spots very misleading) book, Nixon Agonistes. Wills writes: "Eisenhower was not a political sophisticate he was a political genius." Behind that infectious smile there resided a cold and calculating mind. Although Eisenhower did not do well scholastically at West Point, he scored extremely high at the even more competitive General Staff School. He was an excellent bridge player and turned poker into an extremely profitable pastime.

More important, says Wills, Eisenhower's army career was largely built on his ability as a writer of manuals and ghost writer of speeches, and he was regarded as an excellent editor, with dogmatic insistence on precise syntax. The fumbling and bumbling and the garbled circumlocutions were so much show biz. This was a conscious strategy of Eisenhower's to avoid answering questions in detail. For example. Wills reports during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, the President's press secretary, James Hagerty, advised him to take a "no comment" position on the whole issue. "Don't worry, Jim . . . . If that question comes up. I'll just confuse them," replied Eisenhower. It takes superior intelligence to be able to deliberately double-talk one's way out of tough situations. The President's speech writer, Emmett John Hughes, acknowledged that Eisenhower "made not one politically significant verbal blunder throughout eight years of press conferences and public addresses."


10 things Democrats will take away from us if they win control of the House and Senate

What impact will President Trump's campaign efforts have on the midterm elections? Talk radio panel weighs in.

Rescinding the historic Trump tax cuts will merely be the beginning of the scorched-earth destruction that the Democrats will engage in should they become the majority party in the House and Senate in January.

Here are the 10 things that Democrats will take away from the American people if they win in November:

Your money. When House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said that bonuses stimulated by President Trump’s tax cut were “

Economic growth. One of the first things President Trump did to stimulate the economy was to remove harmful regulations that left our

New jobs. If there’s one thing Democrats are good at, it’s killing American jobs. During President Obama’s tenure in office, roughly

Quality health-care. Democrats have proven that they’ll live and die with ObamaCare. It cost them the midterms in 2010 and 2014, and resulted in

Progress on peace. Before leaving office, President Obama prosecute ICE officers tells you all you need to know.

Gun rights. Democrats “should seek more effective and more lasting reform," former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens recently

Our voices on social media. Time and time again, we’ve seen Democrats defend censorship on social media platforms. They side with the likes of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey, who believe that the First Amendment only applies as far as they see fit. Our ability to engage in public discourse on online social media platforms will be restricted by their restrictive set of rules.

Stable government. The most dramatic step the Democrats will take if given the chance is to impeach President Trump. The Democrats have been talking about impeachment since before the president’s inauguration. They want to punish him for winning an election they thought was theirs to win. And without President Trump in the way, Sens. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Kamala Harris of California, or Bernie Sanders of Vermont will have a clear path to victory in 2020 on the Democratic presidential ticket.

The choice is clear for voters Nov. 6. America can continue in the direction it’s going, or backtrack to the ways of the past. We’ve gained so much since President Trump took office. Don’t let the Democrats take it away.


Senator Nixon Takes Tough Stand on Communism - HISTORY

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Eisenhower Warns G.O.P. Right Wing Chides Knowland: Insists Party Must Follow a Progressive Course or Face Loss of Influence

East Bloc Says Joint Army Will Counter Bonn in NATO

Atom Power Seen as Common in 1976: Half of All Electric Plants Then Building Will Use It, G.E. Head Tells N.A.M.

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Washington, Dec 2--The Senate voted 67 to 22 tonight to condemn Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican Senator from Wisconsin.

Every one of the forty-four Democrats present voted against Mr. McCarthy. The Republicans were evenly divided--twenty-two for condemnation and twenty-two against. The one independent, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, also voted against Mr. McCarthy.

In the ultimate action the Senate voted to condemn Senator McCarthy for contempt of a Senate Elections subcommittee that investigated his conduct and financial affairs, for abuse of its members, and for his insults to the Senate itself during the censure proceeding.

Lost in a day of complex and often confused parliamentary maneuvering was the proposal to censure Senator McCarthy for his denunciation of Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker as unfit to wear his uniform

This proposal was defeated by a parliamentary device that avoided a direct vote on the merits of the issue. Inquiry among influential Senators indicated they considered the Zwicker proposal a dilemma they wished to avoid.

Amendment Substituted

They said they wished to censure because the facts warranted it. If they failed to do so, they believed large elements of the public would feel the Senate took notice of offenses only against itself and not against ordinary citizens.

But also if they did censure for this, then Senator McCarthy could exploit the decision, contending he was being punished for his effort to expose former Maj. Irving Peress, the Army dentist who was promoted and honorably discharged, and who was denounced by Mr. McCarthy as a "Fifth Amendment Communist."

Mr. McCarthy&aposs denunciation of General Zwicker, who was commanding officer at Camp Kilmer, N. J., when Dr. Peress was discharged, occurred when the Senator interrogated General Zwicker on the question of who had promoted Dr. Peress.

The direct test on the Zwicker issue was avoided by the substitution of the amendment to condemn Senator McCarthy for having insulted the Senate during his censure trial.

McCarthy Loses Three Tests

Thus in its final form the resolution of condemnation was in two parts, covering the offenses against the Elections subcommittee and its members in the first part, and against the Senate in the second. Three test votes were all lost by Mr. McCarthy before the final condemnation.

First was a motion to table the Zwicker proposal, made by Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, the president pro tem of the Senate, who assumed the leadership of the effort to save Mr. McCarthy yesterday.

Such a motion, if it had succeeded, might have led to a situation that would have prolonged the debate.

But amid signs that the Zwicker issue would have tough sleddings, Senator Wallace F. Bennett, Republican of Utah, served notice that if Mr. Bridges&apos move were defeated he would attempt to substitute for the Zwicker issue his amendment for abuse of the Senate. The significance of this was that an amendment by substitution would require no time out for debate.

Then the voting proceeded. The motion to table was defeated 55 to 33. Mr. Bennett&aposs motion to substitute passed by 64 to 23 and in the next vote his amendment was adopted by the same tally.

The final vote placing Mr. McCarthy under moral condemnation by the Senate came at 5:03 P.M.

The moment of decision was something of an anti-climax after days of emotional and bitter debate. It was punctuated by mocking laughter from the hard core of Mr. McCarthy&aposs adherents.

The accused Senator was present, but he was not led to the bar of the Senate to hear any punishment. Instead Mr. Bridges arose from the coterie in the vicinity of Mr. McCarthy and asked Vice President Richard M. Nixon if the word "censure" appeared anywhere in the resolution in its final form.

Laughter from Senator William E. Jenner, Republican of Indiana, and one of Mr. McCarthy&aposs most vociferous supporters, resounded through the chamber. Senator McCarthy was grinning. Senator George W. Malone, Republican of Nevada, standing by Senator Jenner, was laughing, and so was Senator Herman Welker, Republican of Idaho, sitting beside Mr. Jenner, who all through the debate made the running defense for Mr. McCarthy.

Mr. Jenner guffawed loudly again as Mr. Nixon, after examining the text with a clerk announced the word "censure" was absent. The document used the word "condemned" in each of its two parts, it was explained.

"Then it is not a censure resolution," said Mr. Bridges, who by virtue of his office presides over the Senate when Mr. Nixon is absent. He also asked if condemnation was censure.

Fulbright Reads Definitions

"The resolution does concern the conduct of the junior Senator from Wisconsin," replied the Vice President. "The interpretation must be that of the Senator or any other Senator."

Then Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, rose with Webster&aposs International Dictionary before him and read definitions of condemn and censure amid general laughter. Senator Jenner, without asking for the floor said, "Let&aposs do it over again. Let&aposs do a retake."

Senator Bridges then remarked that this was "peculiar censure" to discover after all the time and expense of a special Senate session that the resolution did not contain the word "censure."

Senator Fulbright asserted that Senator Welker had attached a more serious meaning to "condemn" than to "censure." Earlier today in one of his impassioned speeches Mr. Welker had said, "You don&apost censure a man to death, you condemn him to death."

Senator Arthur V. Watkins, Republican of Utah, who was chairman of the special committee that recommended censure, then said that in the last censure proceeding, twenty-five years ago, the word "censure" was not used but that the resolution had stated that "such conduct s hereby condemned."

"The point I wanted to make," said Senator Watkins, "is that it is the historical word used in censure resolutions."

Then Mr. Jenner asked for the floor in the usual parliamentary way, this time, to remark, grinning, there was some confusion and "do you suppose we could do it all over again?"

Senator Welker rose to comment on definitions and referred to the censure proceedings as a "mock court."

Shortly afterward Senator McCarthy left. He had been in the Senate chamber only briefly, coming in after the final roll-call on the ultimate vote had started. He said "present" instead of voting on the issue that is bound to have a marked effect on his political career.

Later, outside the chamber, reporters asked him if he felt he had been censured.

"Well, it wasn&apost exactly a vote of confidence," replied Mr. McCarthy, who was still wearing his right arm in a bandage for the bursitis that had interrupted the censure proceedings for ten days.

"I&aposm happy to have this circus ended so I can get back to the real work of digging out communism, crime and corruption," he continued. "That job will start officially Monday morning, after ten months of inaction." He was referring to a coming inquiry into alleged Communists in defense plants.

He had referred to the session as a "lynch party"--one of the remarks for which he was condemned in the Bennett amendment--and was asked if he felt he had been "lynched."

"I don&apost feel I have been lynched," he replied.

He expressed his disappointment that the Democrats had voted "straight down the party line, even though they had declared before it started that this was to be a judicial proceeding."

Among Democrats the view was that he might have received a number of their votes if he had not condemned the whole Democratic party some months ago as "the party of treason."

Mr. McCarthy said after referring to the "circus" that he felt no different than he had last night. That is when he had referred to the censure proceeding as a "farce" and a "foul job."

Shouting objections, Senator Jenner opposed an amendment by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, and vice chairman of the censure committee, that would have placed the Senate on record in the censure resolution as being against communism and determined to investigate subversion relentlessly.

"You&aposre not going to gild the lily now," shouted Senator Jenner. "The record has been made and you are going to stay with it."

He declared that the Democrats had permitted Communists to steal Government secrets through infiltration of the Government.

Senator Price Daniels, Democrat of Texas, then made an eloquent plea, proposing that the resolution be amended to state that the resolution be amended to state that the resolution should not be construed to limit the investigative powers of the Senate, especially as to any communist conspiracy.

He said he wanted to do this to counter the McCarthy charge that the Communist party had reached into the Senate to make a censure committee "do the work of the Communist party.

"I want to make them [the Communists] unhappy and they will be unhappy if you will permit this amendment to be adopted," said Mr. Daniels to Mr. Jenner. "We will be able to say to the world that the allegation is untrue that the Communist party instigated this."

Vice President Nixon ruled that under a consent agreement between the two parties neither the Johnson nor the Daniel amendment could be accepted because it was not germane to the issue of censure.

Flanders Retracts One Point

Toward the end of the Senate session, which adjourned sine die for this year at 7:10 P.M., Senator Ralph E. Flanders, Republican of Vermont, who had sponsored the original censure resolution, said he would stand by all the speeches he had made against Senator McCarthy except that he would like to apologize for a passage in a speech of last March, when he had likened Mr. McCarthy to Hitler.

He also asked unanimous consent to strike the passage from whatever volumes of The Congressional Record remained unbound, but Senator Welker made the single objection that prevented this.

Senators McCarthy, Welker and Jenner have threatened to file counter censure resolutions against Senators Flanders, Fulbright and Morse, who had filed the specifications for the McCarthy censure action. They gave no indication of their plans, and adjournment of the Senate tonight would compel them to wait until the next session.

But Senator Jenner threatened Mr. Flanders with a subpoena if he did not appear before some committee to testify about any relations he might have had with Owen Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore is a former State Department consultant and professor at Johns Hopkins University who is under indictment on a charge of perjury in a Congressional hearing on his alleged Communist associations.

General Zwicker, now with combat troops in Japan, was criticized by a few McCarthy adherents today as an arrogant and evasive witness against the contrary evidence of the censure committee, which had called him as a witness.

He had a great many champions, though, even among some Senators who said they would not vote for censure in his case, though they deplored the treatment he had received.

Senator Herbert H. Lehman, Democrat of New York, was among those urging censure in the Zwicker incident. The view of this group was that it would be notice to the country that the Senate was interested only in the offenses against itself but cared nothing of abusive treatment of ordinary citizens.

Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma, declared that failure to censure on this count would be notice to the public that the Senate was "a privileged class." He asserted the Zwicker incident was a prime example of how Senator McCarthy indiscriminately abused heroes of the United States and Communists.

Senator Monroney also said failure to censure on this count would be notice that it was all right to place wire taps and intercept mail and telephone calls of teachers, professors, private citizens, whether it was constitutional or not, but that it was not all right to do so in the case of the ninety-six Senators.

It would also amount to saying, he added, that "We are sacrosanct, we are going to disregard the constitutional guarantees."

His allusion here was to the charge by Senator McCarthy that the Elections subcommittee that had investigated his conduct and finances in 1952 had kept a undercover watch on his mail and telephone calls.

Mr. McCarthy contended this was illegal, but the debate brought out yesterday that the subcommittee had been investigating the charge that Senator McCarthy was using money sent him by the public to fight communism to speculate on a commodity exchange.

Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican of Michigan, a Silver Star Army veteran who lost both legs in combat, said he also favored censure in the Zwicker case.

Senator Irving M. Ives, Republican of New York, defeated in the race for Governor in the recent election, kept silent on the McCarthy issue all through the debate, but voted against Mr. McCarthy.

However, whenever Senator Watkins made the pro forma motions to reconsider each vote--a technicality needed to make it final--Senator Ives each time made the necessary motion to table.


Senator Nixon Takes Tough Stand on Communism - HISTORY

I read Richard Nixon’s 1999: Victory Without War. The book is entitled 1999, but it was actually published in 1988. Come to think of it, I remember Dan Quayle referring to it as the 1988 Republican Vice-Presidential candidate in his debate with Senator Lloyd Bentsen (the “You’re no Jack Kennedy” debate).

1. Nixon discusses the end of detente, his system of negotiations and easing of tensions with the Soviet Union. Nixon is against a number of arguments from hardliners and doves, and he apparently regards detente as a middle ground between those two extremes. Because detente entails the U.S. talking with the Soviets, it allows the U.S. to have influence over what the U.S.S.R. does, whether that concerns Soviet expansionism or arms control. When the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a fairly easygoing relationship, Nixon argues, the U.S.S.R. is more likely to treat its own citizens well rather than abusing them, whereas isolating the U.S.S.R. is counterproductive. Nixon also notes that, during his practice of detente as President, the Soviets did not make significant gains in terms of taking over other countries.

Nixon traces the end of detente to America’s loss of the Vietnam War. Essentially, he argues that this loss demoralized the U.S. from taking a tough stand in protecting its own interests, and thus the U.S. accepted any agreement the Kremlin wanted. There wasn’t any more tough negotiation, in which the U.S. does what the Soviets want in one area, if the Soviets do what the U.S. wants in another area. Meanwhile, the U.S. was cutting its defense budget and hindering U.S. assistance to South Vietnam, even as the U.S.S.R. “increased its military aid to North Vietnam” (page 58). But Nixon also notes an example of a hardline stance shattering the effectiveness of detente. Because the U.S. Congress deprived the U.S.S.R. of Most Favored Nation Trade status, until the U.S.S.R. permitted more Soviet Jews to leave, the U.S. could no longer use trade as a “carrot” to encourage the U.S.S.R. to do what it wanted. Nixon summarizes the demise of detente on page 58:

“When Congress refused to grant the Soviet Union most-favored nation status, it took away the carrot. When it cut the defense budget and hamstrung the President’s ability to react to Soviet aggression, it left the United States with a weak stick. Those actions sent the wrong message to the Kremlin. They in effect telegraphed Moscow that it could pursue its aggressive policies at little or no cost.”


Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon Third Joint Radio-Television Broadcast, October 13, 1960

[Text, format, and style are as published in Freedom of Communications: Final Report of the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate. Part III: The Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Other 1960 Campaign Presentations. 87th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 994, Part 3. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.]

Thursday, October 13, 1960
Originating ABC, Hollywood, Calif., and New York, N.Y., All Networks Carried.
Moderator: Bill Shadel, ABC.

Moderator: Bill Shadel, ABC.

Panelists: Roscoe Drummond, New York Herald Tribune Douglas S. Cater, Reporter magazine Charles Von Fremd, CBS Frank McGee, NBC.

MR. SHADEL: Good evening. I'm Bill Shadel of ABC News.

It's my privilege this evening to preside at this, the third in the series of meetings on radio and television, of the two major presidential candidates. Now, like the last meeting, the subjects to be discussed will be suggested by questions from a panel of correspondents. Unlike the first two programs, however, the two candidates will not be sharing the same platform.

In New York, the Democratic presidential nominee, Senator John F. Kennedy. Separated by 3,000 miles in a Los Angeles studio, the Republican presidential nominee, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, now joined for tonight's discussion by a network of electronic facilities which permits each candidate to see and hear the other.

Good evening, Senator Kennedy.

MR. KENNEDY: Good evening, Mr. Shadel.

MR. SHADEL: And good evening to you, Vice President Nixon.

MR. NIXON: Good evening, Mr. Shadel.

MR. SHADEL: And now to meet the panel of correspondents: Frank McGee, NBC News Charles Von Fremd, CBS News Douglass Cater, Reporter magazine Roscoe Drummond, New York Herald Tribune.

Now as you've probably noted, the four reporters include a newspaperman and a magazine reporter. These two, selected by lot by the press secretaries of the candidates from among the reporters traveling with the candidates. The broadcasting representatives were chosen by their companies.

The rules for this evening have been agreed upon by the representatives of both candidates and the radio and television networks and I should like to read them:

There will be no opening statements by the candidates, nor any closing summation.

The entire hour will be devoted to answering questions from the reporters. Each candidate to be questioned in turn with opportunity for comment by the other. Each answer will be limited to 2 1/2 minutes each comment to 1 1/2 minutes.

The reporters are free to ask any question they choose, on any subject.

Neither candidate knows what questions will be asked. Time alone will determine who will be asked the final question.

Now the first question is from Mr. McGee, and is for Senator Kennedy.

MR. McGEE: Senator Kennedy, yesterday you used the words "trigger happy" in referring to Vice President Richard Nixon's stand on defending the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Last week on a program like this one you said the next President would come face to face with a serious crisis in Berlin.

So the question is: Would you take military action to defend Berlin?

MR. KENNEDY: Mr. McGee, we have a contractual right to be in Berlin coming out of the conversations at Potsdam and of World War II. That has been reinforced by direct commitments of the President of the United States. It's been reinforced by a number of other nations under NATO.

I've stated on many occasions that the United States must meet its commitment on Berlin. It is a commitment that we have to meet if we're going to protect the security of Western Europe. And, therefore, on this question I don't think that there is any doubt in the mind of any American I hope there is not any doubt in the mind of any member of the community of West Berlin. I am sure there isn't any doubt in the mind of the Russians. We will meet our commitments to maintain the freedom and independence of West Berlin.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Vice President, do you wish to comment?

MR. NIXON: Yes. As a matter of fact, the statement that Senator Kennedy made was that--was to the effect that there were trigger happy Republicans, that my stand on Quemoy and Matsu was an indication of trigger happy Republicans. I resent that comment. I resent it because that's an implication that Republicans have been trigger happy and, therefore, would lead this Nation into war. I would remind Senator Kennedy of the past 50 years. I would ask him to name one Republican President who led this Nation into war. There were three Democratic Presidents who led us into war. I do not mean by that that one party is a war party and the other party is a peace party. But I do say that any statement to the effect that the Republican party is trigger happy is belied by the record. We had a war when we came into power in 1953. We got rid of that we've kept out of other wars and certainly that doesn't indicate that we're trigger happy.

We've been strong, but we haven't been trigger happy. As far as Berlin is concerned, there isn't any question about the necessity of defending Berlin the rights of people there to be free, and there isn't any question about what the united American people, Republicans and Democrats alike, would do in the event there were an attempt by the Communists to take over Berlin.

MR. SHADEL: The next question is by Mr. von Fremd for Vice President Nixon.

MR. VON FREMD: Mr. Vice President, a two-part question concerning the offshore islands in the Formosa Straits. If you were President and the Chinese Communists tomorrow began an invasion of Quemoy and Matsu, would you launch the United States into a war by sending the 7th Fleet and other military forces to resist this aggression and secondly, if the regular, conventional forces failed to halt such an invasion, would you authorize the use of nuclear weapons?

MR. NIXON: Mr. von Fremd, it would be completely irresponsible for a candidate for the Presidency or for a President himself, to indicate the course of action and the weapons he would use in the event of such an attack. I will say this: In the event that such an attack occurred, and in the event the attack was a prelude to an attack on Formosa, which would be the indication today, because the Chinese Communists say over and over again that their objective is not the offshore islands, that they consider them only steppingstones to taking Formosa--in the event that their attack, then, were a prelude to an attack on Formosa, there isn't any question but that the United States would then again, as in the case of Berlin, honor our treaty obligations and stand by our ally, Formosa.

But to indicate in advance how we would respond, to indicate the nature of this response, would be incorrect. It would certainly be inappropriate. It would not be in the best interests of the United States.

I will only say this, however, in addition. To do what Senator Kennedy has suggested, to suggest that we will surrender these islands or force our Chinese Nationalist allies to surrender them in advance, is not something that would lead to peace, it is something that would lead, in my opinion, to war.

This is the history of dealing with dictators. This is something that Senator Kennedy and all Americans must know. We tried this with Hitler. It didn't work. He wanted first, we know, Austria, and then he went on to the Sudetenland, and then Danzig, and each time it was thought this is all that he wanted.

Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don't want just Formosa they want the world. And the question is, if you surrender or indicate in advance that you're not going to defend any part of the free world, and you figure that's going to satisfy them, it doesn't satisfy them, It only whets their appetite.

And then the question comes: When do you stop them?

I've often heard President Eisenhower in discussing this question, make the statement that if we once start the process of indicating that this point or that point is not the place to stop those who threaten the peace and freedom of the world, where do we stop them? And I say that those of us who stand against surrender of territory, this or any others, in the face of blackmail, in the face of force by the Communists, are standing for the course that will lead to peace.

MR. SHADEL: Senator Kennedy, do you wish to comment?

MR. KENNEDY: Yes. The whole--the United States now has a treaty which I voted for in the United States Senate in 1955, to defend Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The islands which Mr. Nixon is discussing are 5 or 4 miles, respectively, off the coast of China. Now when Senator Green, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to the President, he received back on the second of October, 1958: "Neither you nor any other American need feel the U.S. will be involved in military hostilities merely in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu."

Now, that is the issue. I believe we must meet our commitment to Formosa. I support it and the Pescadores Island. That is the present American position. The treaty does not include these two islands. Mr. Nixon suggests that the United States should go to war if these two islands are attacked. I suggest that if Formosa is attacked or the Pescadores or if there's any military action in any area which indicates an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores then, of course, the United States is at war to defend its treaty.

Now I must say what Mr. Nixon wants to do is commit us, as I understand him--so that we can be clear if there's a disagreement. Hhe wants us to be committed to the defense of these islands merely as the defense of these islands as free territory, not as part of the defense of Formosa. Admiral Yarnell, the commander of the Asiatic fleet, has said that these islands are not worth the bones of a single American. The President of the United States has indicated they are not within the treaty area. They were not within the treaty area when the treaty was passed in 55. We have attempted to persuade Chiang Kai-shek as late as January of 1959 to reduce the number of troops he has on there. This is a serious issue, and I think we ought to understand completely if we disagree, and if so, where.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Cater has the next question for Senator Kennedy.

MR. CATER: Senator Kennedy, last week you said that before we should hold another summit conference, that it was important that the United States build its strength. Modern weapons take quite a long time to build. What sort of prolonged period do you envisage before there can be a summit conference, and do you think that there can be any new initiatives on the grounds of nuclear disarmament and nuclear control, or weapons control during this period?

MR. KENNEDY: Well, I think we should strengthen our conventional forces. And we should attempt in January, February, and March of next year to increase the airlift capacity of our conventional forces. Then I believe that we should move full time on our missile production, particularly on Minuteman and on Polaris. It may be a long period, but we must get started immediately.

Now on the question of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, I must say that I feel that another effort should be made by a new administration in January of 1961 to renew negotiations with the Soviet Union and see whether it's possible to come to some conclusion which will lessen the chances of contamination of the atmosphere and also lessen the chances that other powers will begin to possess a nuclear capacity. There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious. There have been many wars in the history of mankind and to take a chance now and not make every effort that we could make to provide for some control over these weapons, I think, would be a great mistake. One of my disagreements with the present administration has been that I don't feel a real effort has been made on this very sensitive subject, not only of nuclear controls, but also of general disarmament.

Less than a hundred people have been working throughout the entire Federal Government on this subject and I believe it's been reflected in our success and failures at Geneva. Now we may not succeed. The Soviet Union may not agree to an inspection system. We may not be able to get satisfactory assurances, it may be necessary for us to begin testing again, but I hope the next administration--and if I have anything to do with it--the next administration will make one last great effort to provide for control of nuclear testing, control of nuclear weapons. If possible, control of outer space free from weapons and also to begin again the subject of general disarmament levels. These must be done. If we cannot succeed, then we must strengthen ourselves. But I would make the effort because I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Vice President, your comment?

MR. NIXON: Yes. I am going to make a major speech on this whole subject next week before the next debate and I will have an opportunity then to answer any other questions that may arise with regard to my position on it. There isn't any question but that we must move forward in every possible way to reduce the danger of war to move toward controlled disarmament to control tests. But also let's have in mind this: When Senator Kennedy suggests that we haven't been making an effort, he simply doesn't know what he's talking about.

It isn't a question of the number of people who are working in an administration. It's a question of who they are. This has been one of the highest level operations in the whole State Department, right under the President himself. We have gone certainly the extra mile and then some in making offers to the Soviet Union on control of tests, on disarmament, and in every other way. And I just want to make one thing very clear. Yes, we should make a great effort, but under no circumstances must the United States ever make an agreement based on trust. There must be an absolute guarantee.

Now just to comment on Senator Kennedy's last answer. He forgets that in this same debate on the Formosa resolution, which he said he voted for, which he did, that he voted against an amendment, or was recorded against an amendment, and on this particular--or for an amendment, I should say, which passed the Senate overwhelmingly 70 to 12, and that amendment put the Senate of the United States on record with a majority of the Senator's own party voting for it, as well as the majority of Republican, put them on record against the very position that the Senator takes now of surrendering, of indicating in advance, that the United States will not defend the offshore islands.

MR. SHADEL: The next question is by Mr. Drummond for Vice President Nixon.

MR. DRUMMOND: Mr. Nixon, I would like to ask one more aspect or raise another aspect of this same question. It is my understanding that President Eisenhower never advocated that Quemoy and Matsu should be defended under all circumstances as a matter of principle. I heard Secretary Dulles at a press conference in 58 say that he thought that it was a mistake for Chiang Kai-shek to deploy troops to these islands. I would like to ask what has led you to take what appears to be a different position on this subject?

MR. NIXON: Well Mr. Drummond, first of all, referring to Secretary Dulles' press conference, I think if you read it all, and I know that you have, you will find that Secretary Dulles also indicated in that press conference that when the troops were withdrawn from Quemoy, that the implication was certainly of everything that he said, that Quemoy could better be defended. There were too many infantrymen there, not enough heavy artillery and certainly I don't think there was any implication in Secretary Dulles' statement that Quemoy and Matsu should not be defended in the event that they were attacked and that attack was a preliminary to an attack on Formosa.

Now, as far as President Eisenhower is concerned, I have often heard him discuss this question. As I related a moment ago, the President has always indicated that we must not make the mistake in dealing with the dictator of indicating that we are going to make a concession at the point of a gun. Whenever you do that, inevitably the dictator is encouraged to try it again. So first it will be Quemoy and Matsu. Next it may be Formosa. What do we do then?

My point is this: that once you do this, follow this course of action, of indicating that you are not going to defend a particular area, the inevitable result is that it encourages a man who is determined to conquer the world to press you to the point of no return. And that means war.

We went through this tragic experience leading to World War II. We learned our lesson again in Korea. We must not learn it again. That is why I think the Senate was right, including a majority of the Democrats, a majority of the Republicans, when they rejected Senator Kennedy's position in 1955 and, incidentally, Senator Johnson was among those who rejected that position, voted with the 70 against the 12.

The Senate was right, because they knew the lesson of history, and may I say, too, that I would trust that Senator Kennedy would change his position on this, change it because as long as he, as a major Presidential candidate, continues to suggest that we are going to turn over these islands, he is only encouraging the aggressors, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet aggressors, to press the United States, to press us to the point where war would be inevitable.

The road to war is always paved with good intentions, and in this instance the good intentions, of course, are a desire for peace. But certainly we're not going to have peace by giving in and indicating in advance that we are not going to defend what has become a symbol of freedom.

MR. SHADEL: Senator Kennedy.

MR. KENNEDY: I don't think it's possible for Mr. Nixon to state the record in distortion of the facts with more precision than he just did. In 1955, Mr. Dulles, in a press conference said, "The treaty that we have with the Republic of China excludes Quemoy and Matsu from the treaty area." That was done with much thought and deliberation. Therefore, that treaty does not commit the United States to defend anything except Formosa and the Pescadores, and to deal with acts against that treaty area.

I completely sustained the treaty. I voted for it. I would take any action necessary to defend the treaty, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands. What we're now talking about is the Vice President's determination to guarantee Quemoy and Matsu, which are 4 and 5 miles off the coast of Red China, which are not within the treaty area.

I do not suggest that Chiang Kai-shek--and this administration has been attempting since 1955 to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to lessen his troop commitments. He sent a mission to the the President in 1955 of Mr.Robertson, and Admiral Radford and General Twining said they were still doing it in 1959. General Ridgway said, who was Chief of Staff, "To go to war for Quemoy and Matsu to me would seem an unwarranted and tragic course to take. To me that concept is completely repugnant."

So I stand with them. I stand with the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, who said these islands were indefensible. I believe that we should meet our commitments and if the Chinese Communists attack the Pescadores and Formosa, they know that it will mean a war. I would not hand over these islands under any point of gun, but I merely say that the treaty is quite precise and I sustain the treaty.

Mr. Nixon would add a guarantee to islands 5 miles off the coast of the Republic of China, when he's never really protested the Communists seizing Cuba, 90 miles off the coast of the United States.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. von Fremd has a question for Senator Kennedy.

MR. VON FREMD: Senator Kennedy, I would like to shift the conversation, if I may, to a domestic political argument. The chairman of the Republican National Committee, Senator Thruston Morton, declared earlier this week that you owed Vice President Nixon and the Republican party a public apology for some strong charges made by former President Harry Truman, who bluntly suggested where the Vice President and the Republican party could go. Do you feel that you owe the Vice President an apology?

MR. KENNEDY: Well, I must say that Mr. Truman has his methods of expressing things he's been in politics for 50 years he's been President of the United States. Maybe it's not my style, but I really don't think there's anything that I can say to President Truman that's going to cause him, at the age of 76, to change his particular speaking manner.

Perhaps Mrs. Truman can, but I don't think I can. I'll just have to tell Mr. Morton that, if you'd pass that message on to him.

MR. SHADEL: Any comment, Mr. Vice President?

MR. NIXON: Yes, I think so. Of course, both Senator Kennedy and I have felt Mr. Truman's ire, and consequently, I think he can speak with some feeling on this subject. I just do want to say one thing, however. We all have tempers, I have one, I am sure Senator Kennedy has one, but when a man is President of the United States or a former President, he has an obligation not to lose his temper in public. One thing I have noted as I have traveled around the country are the tremendous number of children who come out to see the presidential candidates. I see mothers holding their babies up, so that they can see a man who might be President of the United States. I know Senator Kennedy sees them, too. It makes you realize that whoever is President is going to be a man that all the children of America will either look up to, or will look down to, and I can only say that I'm very proud that President Eisenhower restored dignity and decency and, frankly, good language to the conduct of the Presidency of the United States. And I only hope that, should I win this election, that I could approach President Eisenhower in maintaining the dignity of the office, in seeing to it that whenever any mother or father talks to his child, he can look at the man in the White House, and whatever he may think of his policies, he will say: "Well, there is a man who maintains the kind of standards personally that I would want my child to follow."

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Cater's question is for Vice President Nixon.

MR. CATER: Mr. Vice President, I'd like to return just once more, if I may, to this area of dealing with the Communists. Critics have claimed that on at least three occasions in recent years, on the sending of American troops to Indochina in 1954, on the matter of continuing the U-2 flights in May, and then on this definition of our commitment to the offshore island, that you have overstated the administration position, that you have taken a more bellicose position than President Eisenhower.

Just 2 days ago you said that you called on Senator Kennedy to serve notice to Communist aggressors around the world that we're not going to retreat 1 inch more any place, whereas we did retreat from the Taichen Islands, or at least Chiang Kai-shek did. Would you say this was a valid criticism of your statement of foreign policy?

MR. NIXON: Well, Mr. Cater, of course it's a criticism that is being made. I obviously don't think it's valid. I have supported the administration's position and I think that that position has been correct I think my position has been correct.

As far as Indochina was concerned, I stated over and over again that it was essential during that period that the United States make it clear that we would not tolerate Indochina falling under Communist domination.

Now, as a result of our taking the strong stand that we did, the civil war there was ended and today, at least in the south of Indochina, the Communists have moved out and we do have a strong, free bastion there.

Now looking to the U-2 flights, I would like to point out that I have been supporting the President's position throughout. I think the President was correct in ordering these flights. I think the President was correct, certainly, in his decision to continue the flights while the conference was going on.

I noted, for example, in reading a particular discussion that Senator Kennedy had with Dave Garroway shortly after the--his statement about regrets that he made the statement that he felt that these particular flights were ones that shouldn't have occurred right at that time, and the indication was, how would Mr. Khrushchev had felt if we had had a flight over the--how would we have felt if Mr. Khrushchev had a flight over the United States while he was visiting here. And the answer, of course, is that Communist espionage goes on all the time. The answer is that the United States can't afford to have a an espionage lack or--lag, or should I say an intelligence lag, any more than we can afford to have a missile lag.

Now referring to your question with regard to Quemoy and Matsu, what I object to here is the constant reference to surrendering these islands. Senator Kennedy quotes the record, which he read from a moment ago, but what he forgets to point out is that the key vote, a vote which I've referred to several times, where he was in the minority, was one which rejected his position.

Now, why did they reject it? For the very reason that those Senators knew, as the President of the United States knew, that you should not indicate to the Communists in advance that you're going to surrender an area that's free. Why? Because they know as Senator Kennedy will have to know that if you do that you encourage them to more aggression.

MR. SHADEL: Senator Kennedy?

MR. KENNEDY: Well No. 1 on Indochina, Mr. Nixon talked before the newspaper editors in the spring of 1954 about putting, and I quote him, "American boys into Indochina." The reason Indochina was preserved, was the result of the Geneva Conference which partitioned Indochina.

No. 2, on the question of the U-2 flights. I thought theU-2 flight in May just before the conference was a mistake in timing because of the hazards involved if the summit conference had any hope for success. I never criticized the U-2 flights in general, however. I never suggested espionage should stop. It still goes on, I would assume, on both sides.

No. 3, the Vice President, on May 15, after the U-2 flights, indicated that the flights were going on, even though the administration and the President had canceled the flights on May 12.

No. 3 [4 corrected], the Vice President suggests that we should keep the Communists in doubt about whether we would fight on Quemoy and Matsu. That's not the position he's taking. He's indicating that we should fight for these islands, come what may, because they are, in his words, "in the area of freedom."

He didn't take that position on Tibet. He didn't take that position on Budapest. He doesn't take that position that I've seen so far in Laos. Guinea and Ghana have both moved within the Soviet sphere of influence on foreign policy so has Cuba.

I merely say that the United States should meet its commitments to Formosa and the Pescadores. But as Admiral Yarnell has said, and he's been supported by most military authorities, these islands that we're now talking about are not worth the bones of a single American soldier and I know how difficult it is to sustain troops close to the shore under artillery bombardment. And therefore, I think we should make it very clear the disagreement between Mr. Nixon and myself. He's extending the administration's commitment.

MR. SHADEL: Mr.Drummond's question is for Senator Kennedy.

MR. DRUMMOND: Mr. Kennedy, Representative Adam Clayton Powell in the course of his speaking tour in your behalf is saying and I quote: "The Ku Klux Klan is riding again in this campaign. If it doesn't stop, all bigots will vote for Nixon and all right thinking Christians and Jews will vote for Kennedy rather than be found in the ranks of the Klan-minded."

Gov. Michael Di Salle is saying much the same thing.

What I would like to ask, Senator Kennedy is: What is the purpose of this sort of thing? And how do you feel about it?

MR. KENNEDY: Well, the que--Mr. Griffin, I believe, who is the head of the Klan, who lives in Tampa, Fla., indicated, in a statement, I think 2 or 3 weeks ago that he was not going to vote for me and that he was going to vote for Mr. Nixon. I do not suggest in any way, nor have I ever, that that indicates that Mr. Nixon has the slightest sympathy, involvement or in any way imply any inferences in regard to the Ku Klux Klan. That's absurd. I don't suggest that. I don't support it. I would disagree with it. Mr. Nixon knows very well that this whole matter has been involved-- this so-called religious discussion in this campaign. I have never suggested even by the vaguest implication that he did anything but disapprove of it and that's my view now. I disapprove of the issue. I do not suggest that Mr. Nixon does in any way.

MR. SHADEL: Mr.Vice President.

MR. NIXON: Well, I welcome this opportunity to join Senator Kennedy completely on that statement and to say before this largest television audience in history something that I have been saying in the past and want to--will always say in the future. On our last television debate I pointed out that it was my position that Americans must choose the best man that either party could produce. We can't settle for anything but the best and that means, of course, the best man that this Nation can produce, and that means that we can't have any test of religion. We can't have any test of race. It must be a test of the man.

Also, as far as religion is concerned, I have seen communism abroad. I see what it does. Communism is the enemy of all religions and we who do believe in God must join together. We must not be divided on this issue. The worst thing that I can think can happen in this campaign would be for it to be decided on religious issues. I, obviously, repudiate the Klan. I repudiate anybody who uses the religious issue I will not tolerate it.

I have ordered all of my people to have nothing to do with it and I say to this great audience, whoever may be listening, remember: If you believe in America, if you want America to set the right example to the world, that we cannot have religious or racial prejudice. We cannot have it in our hearts. But we certainly cannot have it in a presidential campaign.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. McGee has a question for Vice President Nixon.

MR. McGEE: Mr. Vice President, some of your early campaign literature said you were making a study to see if new laws were needed to protect the public against excessive use of power by labor unions. Have you decided whether such new laws are needed, and, if so, what would they do?

MR. NIXON: Mr. McGee, I am planning a speech on that subject next week. Also, so that we can get the opportunity for the questioners to question me, it will be before the next television debate.I will say, simply, in advance of it, that I believe that in this area the laws which should be passed, as far as the big national emergency strikes are concerned, are ones that will give the President more weapons with which to deal with those strikes.

Now, I have a basic disagreement with Senator Kennedy, though, on this point. He has taken the position he first indicated in October of last year that he would even favor compulsory arbitration as one of the weapons the President might have to stop a national emergency strike. I understand in his last speech before the Steelworkers Union, that he changed that position and indicated that he felt that Government seizure might be the best way to stop a strike which could not be settled by collective bargaining.

I do not believe we should have either compulsory arbitration or seizure. I think the moment that you give to the union on the one side and to management on the other side, the escape hatch of eventually going to Government to get it settled, that most of these great strikes will end up being settled by Government and that will be in the end, in my opinion, wage control. It will mean price control--all the things that we do not want.

I do believe, however, that we can give to the President of the United States powers, in addition to what he presently has in the factfinding area which would enable him to be more effective than we have been in handling these strikes.

One last point I should make. The record in handling them has been very good during this administration. We have had less man-hours lost by strikes in these last 7 years than we had in the previous 7 years, by a great deal. And I only want to say that however good the record is, it's got to be better because in this critical year--period of the sixties we've got to move forward all Americans must move forward together and we have to get the greatest cooperation possible between labor and management. We cannot afford stoppages of massive effect on the economy when we're in the terrible competition we're in with the Soviets.

MR. SHADEL: Senator, your comment?

MR. KENNEDY: I always have difficulty recognizing my positions when they are stated by the Vice President. I never suggested that compulsory arbitration was the solution for national emergency disputes. I'm opposed to that, was opposed to it in October of 1958. I have suggested that the President should be given other weapons to protect the national interest in case of national emergency strikes beyond the injunction provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. I don't know what other weapons the Vice President is talking about. I'm talking about giving him four or five tools. Not only the factfinding committee that he now has under the injunction provision. Not only the injunction, but also the power of the factfinding commission to make recommendations, recommendations which would not be binding but nevertheless would have great force of public opinion behind them.

One of the additional powers that I would suggest would be seizure. There might be others. The President having five powers, four or five powers, and he only has very limited powers today, neither the company nor the union would be sure which power would be used and therefore there would be a greater incentive on both sides to reach an agreement themselves without taking it to the Government. The difficulty now is the President's course is quite limited. He can set up a factfinding committee. The factfinding committee's powers are limited. He can provide an injunction if there's a national emergency, for 80 days, then a strike can go on, and there are no other powers or actions that the President could take unless he went to the Congress. This is a difficult and sensitive matter but to state my view precisely, the President should have a variety of things he could do. He could leave the parties in doubt as to which one he would use and therefore there would be incentive, instead of as now, the steel companies were ready to take the strike because they felt the injunction of 80 days would break the union, which didn't happen.

MR. SHADEL: The next question is by Mr. Cater for Senator Kennedy.

MR. CATER: Mr. Kennedy, Senator--Vice President Nixon says that he has costed the two party platforms and that yours would run at least $10 billion a year more than his. You have denied his figures. He has called on you to supply your figures. Would you do that?

MR. KENNEDY: Yes, I have stated in both debates and state again that I believe in a balanced budget and have supported that concept during my 14 years in the Congress. The only two times when an unbalanced budget is warranted would be during a serious recession and we had that in '58 in an unbalanced budget of $12 billion or a national emergency where there should be large expenditures for national defense which we had in World War II and during part of the Korean War.

On the question of the cost of our budget, I have stated that it's my best judgment that our agricultural program will cost a billion and a half, possibly $2 billion less than the present agricultural program. My judgment is that the program the Vice President put forward, which is an extension of Mr. Benson's program, will cost a billion dollars more than the present program which costs about $6 billion a year--the most expensive in history. We've spent more money on agriculture in the last 8 years than the hundred years of the Agricultural Department before that.

Secondly, I believe that the high-interest-rate policy that this administration has followed has added about $3 billion a year to interest on the debt, merely funding the debt, which is a burden on the tax base. I would hope under a different monetary policy that it would be possible to reduce that interest rate burden at least a billion dollars.

Third, I think it's possible to gain a $700 million to a billion dollars through tax changes which I believe would close up loopholes on dividend withholding, on expense accounts.

Fourthly, I have suggested that the medical care for the aged and the bill which the Congress now has passed and the President signed, if fully implemented, would cost a billion dollars on the Treasury--out of the Treasury fund and a billion dollars by the States. The proposal that I have put forward and which many of the members of my party support is for medical care financed under social security which would be financed under the social security tax system, which is less than 3 cents a day per person for medical care, doctors' bills, nurses, hospitals, when they retire. It is actuarially sound. So in my judgment we would spend more money in this administration on aid to education, we'd spend more money on housing, we'd spend more money and I hope more wisely, on defense than this administration has done, but I believe that the next administration should work for a balanced budget and that would be my intention. Mr. Nixon misstates my figures constantly, which is of course his right, but the fact of the matter is here is where I stand and I just want to have it on the public record.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Vice President?

MR. NIXON: Senator Kennedy has indicated on several occasions in this program tonight that I have been misstating his record and his figures. I will issue a white paper after this broadcast quoting exactly what he said on compulsory arbitration, for example, and the record will show that I have been correct.

Now as far as his figures are concerned here tonight, he again is engaging in this what I would call mirror game of "here it is and here it isn't." On the one hand, for example, he suggests that as far as his medical care program is concerned, that that really isn't a problem because it's from social security. But social security is a tax. The people pay it. It comes right out of your pay check. This doesn't mean that the people aren't going to be paying the bill. He also indicates as far as his agricultural program is concerned, that he feels it will cost less than ours. Well, all that I can suggest is that all the experts who have studied the program, indicate that it is the most fantastic program, the worst program, insofar as its effect on the farmers, that America has ever had foisted upon it in an election year or any other time, and I would also point out that Senator Kennedy left out a part of the cost of that program--a 25 percent rise in food prices that the people would have to pay.

Now, are we going to have that when it isn't going to help the farmers? I don't think we should have that kind of a program. Then he goes on to say that he's going to change the interest rate situation and we're going to get some more money that way. Well, what he is saying there in effect, we're going to have inflation. We're going to go right back to what we had under Mr. Truman when he had political control of the Federal Reserve Board. I don't believe we ought to pay our bills through inflation, through a phony interest rate.

MR. SHADEL: Next, Mr. Drummond's question for Vice President Nixon.

MR. DRUMMOND: Mr. Nixon, before the convention, you and Governor Rockefeller said jointly that the Nation's economic growth ought to be accelerated and the Republican platform states that the Nation needs to quicken the pace of economic growth. Is it fair, therefore, Mr. Vice President, to conclude that you feel that there has been insufficient economic growth during the past 8 years and if so, what would you do beyond present administration policies to step it up?

MR. NIXON: Mr. Drummond, I am never satisfied with the economic growth of this country. I'm not satisfied with it even if there were no communism in the world, but particularly when we're in the kind of a race we're in, we have got to see that America grows just as fast as we can, provided we grow soundly. Because even though we have maintained, as I pointed out in our first debate, the absolute gap over the Soviet Union even though the growth in this administration has been twice as much as it was in the Truman administration, that isn't good enough because America must be able to grow enough not only to take care of our needs at home for better education and housing and health, all these things we want. We've got to grow enough to maintain the forces that we have abroad and to wage the non-military battle for the war--for the world, in Asia, in Africa and Latin America. It's going to cost more money, and growth will help us to win that battle.

Now, what do we do about it? And here I believe basically that what we have to do is to stimulate that sector of America, the private enterprise sector of the economy, in which there is the greatest possibility for expansion. So that is why I advocate a program of tax reform which will stimulate more investment in our economy. In addition to that, we have to move on other areas that are holding back growth. I refer, for example, to distressed areas. We have to move into those areas with programs so that we make adequate use of the resources of those areas. We also have to see that all of the people of the United States, the tremendous talents that our people have, are used adequately. That's why in this whole area of civil rights, the equality of opportunity for employment and education is not just for the benefit of the minority groups. It is for the benefit of the Nation so that we can get the scientists and the engineers and all the rest that we need. And in addition to that we need programs, particularly in higher education, which will stimulate scientific breakthroughs which will bring more growth.

Now what all this of course adds up to is this: America has not been standing still. Let's get that straight. Anybody who says America's been standing still for the last 7 1/2 years hasn't been traveling around America. He's been traveling in some other country. We have been moving. We have been moving much faster than we did in the Truman years, but we can and must move faster, and that's why I stand so strongly for programs that will move America forward in the sixties, move her forward so that we can stay ahead of the Soviet Union and win the battle for freedom and peace.

MR. SHADEL: Senator Kennedy?

MR. KENNEDY: Well first may I correct a statement which was made before, that under my agricultural program food prices would go up 25 percent. That's untrue. The farmer who grows wheat gets about 2 1/2 cents out of a 25-cent loaf of bread. Even if you put his income up 10 percent, that would be2 3/4 percent or 3 cents out of that 25 cents. The man who grows tomatoes, it costs less for those tomatoes than it does for the label on the can, and I believe when the average-hour for many farmers' wage is about 50 cents an hour he should do better. But anybody who suggests that that program would come to any figure indicated by the Vice President is in error. The Vice President suggested a number of things. He suggested that we aid distressed areas.

The administration has vetoed that bill passed by the Congress twice. He suggested we pass an aid-to-education bill. The administration and the Republican majority in the Congress has opposed any realistic aid to education, and the Vice President cast a deciding vote against Federal aid for teachers' salaries in the Senate which prevented that being added.

This administration and this country last year had the lowest rate of economic growth, which means jobs, of any major industrialized society in the world in 1959. And when we have to find 25,000 new jobs a week for the next 10 years, we're going to have to grow more. Governor Rockefeller says 5 percent. The Democratic platform and others say 5 percent. Many say 4 1/2 percent. The last 8 years the average growth has been about 2 1/2 percent. That's why we don't have full employment today.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. McGee has the next question for Senator Kennedy.

MR. McGEE: Uh - Senator Kennedy, a moment ago you mentioned tax loopholes. Now your running mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, is from Texas, an oil-producing State and one that many political leaders feel is in doubt in this election year, and reports from there say that oil men in Texas are seeking assurance from Senator Johnson that the oil depletion allowance will not be cut. The Democratic platform pledges to plug loopholes in the tax laws and refers to inequitable depletion allowance as being conspicuous loopholes.

My question is, do you consider the 27 1/2 percent depletion allowance inequitable, and would you ask that it be cut?

MR. KENNEDY: Mr. McGee, there are about 104 commodities that have some kind of depletion allowance, different kind of minerals including oil. I believe all of those should be gone over in detail to make sure that no one is getting a tax break, to make sure that no one is getting away from paying the taxes he ought to pay. That includes oil, it includes all kinds of minerals. Iit includes everything within the range of taxation. We want to be sure it's fair and equitable. It includes oil abroad. Perhaps that oil abroad should be treated differently than the oil here at home.

Now, the oil industry recently has had hard times, particularly some of the smaller producers. They're moving about 8 or 9 days in Texas, but I can assure you that if I am elected President, the whole spectrum of taxes will be gone through carefully, and if there's any inequities in oil or any other commodity, then I would vote to close that loophole.

I have voted in the past to reduce the depletion allowance for the largest producers for those from $5 million down to maintain it at 27 1/2 percent. I believe we should study this and other allowances, tax expense, dividend expenses, and all the rest, and make a determination of how we can stimulate growth how we can provide the revenues needed to move our country forward.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Vice President.

MR. NIXON: Senator Kennedy's position and mine are completely different on this. I favor the present depletion allowance. I favor it not because I want to make a lot of oil men rich, but because I want to make America rich. Why do we have a depletion allowance? Because this is the stimulation, the incentive for companies to go out and explore for oil, to develop it. If we didn't have a depletion allowance of certainly I believe the present amount, we would have our oil exploration cut substantially in this country.

Now, as far as my position then is concerned, it is exactly opposite to the Senator's, and it's because of my belief that if America is going to have the growth that he talks about and that I talk about, and that we want, the thing to do is not to discourage individual enterprise, not to discourage people to go out and discover more oil and minerals, but to encourage them, and so he would be doing exactly the wrong thing.

One other thing: He suggests that there are a number of other items in this whole depletion field that could be taken into account. He also said a moment ago that we would get more money to finance his programs by revising the tax laws, including depletion. I should point out, that as far as depletion allowances are concerned, the oil depletion allowance is one that provides 80 percent of all of those involved in depletion, so you're not going to get much from revenue insofar as depletion allowances are concerned, unless you move in the area that he indicated.

But I oppose it. I oppose it for the reasons that I mentioned. I oppose it because I want us to have more oil exploration and not less.

MR. SHADEL: Gentlemen, if I may remind you, time is growing short, so please keep your questions and answers as brief as possible consistent with clarity.

Mr. von Fremd for Vice President Nixon.

MR. VON FREMD: Mr. Vice President, in the past 3 years there has been an exodus of more than $4 billion of gold from the United States apparently for two reasons: because exports have slumped and haven't covered imports, and because of increased American investments abroad. If you were President, how would you go about stopping this departure of gold from our shores?

MR. NIXON: Well, Mr. von Fremd, the first thing we have to do is to continue to keep confidence abroad in the American dollar. That means that we must continue to have a balanced budget here at home in every possible circumstance that we can. Because the moment that we have loss of confidence in our own fiscal policies at home, it results in gold flowing out.

Secondly, we have to increase our exports as compared with our imports. And here we have a very strong program going forward in the Department of Commerce. This one must be stepped up.

Beyond that, as far as the gold supply is concerned, and as far as the movement of gold is concerned, we have to bear in mind that we must get more help from our allies abroad in this great venture in which all free men are involved of winning the battle for freedom.

Now, America has been carrying a tremendous load in this respect. I think we have been right in carrying it. I have favored our programs abroad for economic assistance and for military assistance, but now we find that the countries of Europe, for example, that we have aided and Japan that we've aided in the Far East, these countries, some our former enemies, have now recovered completely. They have got to bear a greater share of this load of economic assistance abroad.

That's why I am advocating, and will develop during the course of the next administration--if, of course, I get the opportunity--a program in which we enlist more aid from these other countries on a concerted basis in the programs of economic development for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The United States cannot continue to carry the major share of this burden by itself. We can carry a big share of it, but we've got to have more help from our friends abroad and these three factors, I think, will be very helpful in reversing the gold flow which you spoke about.

MR. SHADEL: Senator Kennedy.

MR. KENNEDY: Just to correct the record, Mr. Nixon said on depletion that his record was the opposite of mine. What I said was that this matter should be thoroughly gone into to make sure that there aren't loopholes. If his record is the opposite of that, that means that he doesn't want to go into it.

Now, on the question of the gold, the difficulty, of course, is that we do have heavy obligations abroad, that we therefore have to maintain not only a favorable balance of trade but also send a good deal of our dollars overseas to pay our troops, maintain our bases, and sustain other economies.

In other words, if we're going to continue to maintain our position in the sixties, we have to maintain a sound monetary and fiscal policy. We have to have control over inflation, and we also have to have a favorable balance of trade. We have to be able to compete in the world market. We have to be able to sell abroad more than we consume from abroad, if we're going to be able to meet our obligations.

In addition, many of the countries around the world still keep restrictions against our goods, going all the way back to the days when there was a dollar shortage. Now there isn't a dollar shortage, and yet many of these countries continue to move against our goods.

I believe that we must be able to compete in the market--steel and in all the basic commodities abroad--we must be able to compete against them, because we always did because of our technological lead. We have to be sure to maintain that. We have to persuade these other countries not to restrict our goods from coming in, not to act as if there was a dollar gap and third, we have to persuade them to assume some of the responsibilities that up till now we've maintained to assist underdeveloped countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia make an economic breakthrough on their own.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Drummond's question now for Senator Kennedy.

MR. DRUMMOND: Senator Kennedy, a question on American prestige. In light of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador was recently expelled from the Congo and that Mr. Khrushchev has this week canceled his trip to Cuba for fear of stirring resentment throughout all Latin America, I would like to ask you to spell out somewhat more fully how you think we should measure American prestige, to determine whether it is rising or whether it is falling.

MR. KENNEDY: Well, I think there are many tests, Mr. Drummond, of prestige. The significance of prestige really is because we are so identified with the cause of freedom. Therefore, if we are on the mount, if we are rising, if our influence is spreading, if our prestige is spreading, then those who stand now on the razor edge of decision between us or between the Communist system, wondering whether they should use the system of freedom to develop their countries or the system of communism, they will be persuaded to follow our example.

There have been several indications that our prestige is not as high as it once was. Mr. George Allen, the head of our Information Service, said that a result of our being second in space in the sputnik in 1957, and I quote him--I believe I paraphrase him accurately--he said that many of these countries equate space developments with scientific productivity and scientific advancement, and therefore, he said, many of these countries now feel that the Soviet Union, which was once so backward, is now on a par with the United States.

Secondly, the economic growth of the Soviet Union is greater than ours. Mr. Dulles has suggested it's from two to three times as great as ours. This has a great effect on the underdeveloped world which faces problems of low income and high population density and inadequate resources.

Three, a Gallup Poll taken in February asked people in 10 countries which country they thought would be first in 1970, both scientifically and militarily, and a majority in every country, except Greece, felt that it would be the Soviet Union by l970.

Four, in the votes the U.N., particularly the vote dealing with Red China last Saturday, we received the support on the position that we had taken of only two African countries, one, Liberia, which had been tied to us for more than a century, and the other the Union of South Africa, which is not a popular country in Africa. Every other African country either abstained or voted against us. More countries voted against us in Asia on this issue than voted with us.

On the neutralist resolution, which we were so much opposed to, the same thing happened. The candidate who was a candidate for the President of Brazil, took a trip to Cuba to call on Mr. Castro during the election in order to get the benefit of the Castro supporters within Brazil.

There are many indications--Guinea and Ghana, two independent countries within the last 3 years, Guinea in '57, Ghana within the last 18 months both now are supporting the Soviets' foreign policy at the U.N. Mr. Herter said so himself.

Laos is moving in that direction.

So I would say our prestige is not so high. No longer do we give the image of being on the rise. No longer do we give an image of vitality.

MR. SHADEL: Mr. Vice President.

MR. NIXON: Well, I would say first of all that Senator Kennedy's statement that he's just made is not going to help our Gallup Polls abroad, and it isn't going to help our prestige either.

Let's look at the other side of the coin. Let's look at the vote on the Congo. The vote was 70 to 0 against the Soviet Union.

Let's look at the situation with regard to economic growth as it really is. We find that the Soviet Union is a very primitive economy. Its growth rate is not what counts, it's whether it is catching up with us, and it is not catching up with us. We're well ahead and we can stay ahead provided we have confidence in America and don't run her down in order to build her up.

We could look also at other items which Senator Kennedy has named, but I will only conclude by saying this: In this whole matter of prestige, in the final analysis, its whether you stand for what's right, and getting back to this matter that we discussed at the outset, the matter of Quemoy and Matsu, I can think of nothing that will be a greater blow to the prestige of the United States among the free nations in Asia than for us to take Senator Kennedy's advance--advice to go against what a majority of the Members of the Senate, both Democrat and Republican, did--said in 1955, and to say in advance we will surrender an area to the Communists.

In other words, if the United States is going to maintain its strength and its prestige, we must not only be strong militarily and economically, we must be firm diplomatically. Certainly we have been speaking, I know, of whether we should have retreat or defeat. Let's remember that the way to win is not to retreat and not to surrender.

MR. SHADEL: Thank you gentlemen. As we mentioned at the opening of this program, the candidates agreed that the clock alone would determine who had the last word. The two candidates wish to thank the networks for the opportunity to appear for this discussion. I would repeat the ground rules likewise agreed upon by representatives of the two candidates and the radio and television networks.

The entire hour was devoted to answering questions from the reporters. Each candidate was questioned in turn and each had the opportunity to comment on the answer of his opponent.

The reporters were free to ask any question on any subject. Neither candidate was given any advance information on any question that would be asked. Those were the conditions agreed upon for this third meeting of the candidates tonight.

Now I might add that also agreed upon was the fact that when the hour got down to the last few minutes, if there was not sufficient time left for another question and suitable time for answer and comment, the questioning would end at that point.

That is the situation at this moment. And after reviewing the rules for this evening I might use the remaining few moments of the hour to tell you something about the other arrangements for this debate with the participants a continent apart.

I would emphasize first that each candidate was in a studio alone except for three photographers and three reporters of the press and the television technicians--those studios identical in every detail of lighting, background, physical equipment, even to the paint used in decorating. We newsmen in a third studio have also experienced a somewhat similar isolation.

Now, I would remind you the fourth in the series of these historic joint appearances, scheduled for Friday, October 21. At that time the candidates will again share the same platform to discuss foreign policy.

This is Bill Shadel. Goodnight.

Related documents: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. Series 15. Speeches and the Press. Box 1052, Folder: "Television debates: Transcript: Third debate".



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